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ABSTRACT 
It is not often that the science of how the human mind perceives and 
then retrieves information trends on Twitter, but that was the case over 
the last year as first the story broke that Brian Williams had, for years, 
been claiming to witness events he had only seen in photographs.1 
More recently, the world was transfixed by a quirk of visual perception 
that caused some people to see a dress as white and gold, while others 
were just as sure it was blue and black.2 These events, although matters 
of pop culture, are important to understanding a very serious legal 
issue: the inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony. By now, 
stories coming from the Innocence Projects established all over the 
country have shown how often witnesses who are completely confident 
 
1 See, e.g., Slate (@Slate), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2015, 3:58 PM), https://twitter.com/Slate 
/status/563486932039372800. 
2 Jonathan Mahler, The White and Gold (No, Blue and Black!) Dress That Melted the 
Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/business/a            
-simple-question-about-a-dress-and-the-world-weighs-in.html. 
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in their identification of a criminal at the initial police lineup, or even 
at trial, are proved absolutely mistaken. 
This Article demonstrates why efforts to develop brain imaging 
technology that will enhance the human ability to detect deliberate 
deception are doomed to failure because they are based on false 
assumptions about how our brains perceive and store information. It 
does so by bringing together the literature of disparate fields of study, 
including the laws of evidence involving the admission of eyewitness 
testimony and forensic science; contemporary advances in 
neuroimaging; and recent claims of technology that not only detects 
lies, but actually may extract memories of past events from unwilling 
witnesses. This Article then explains that the human mind does not 
passively store events for later retrieval, but rather is always actively 
engaged in making sense of information of past and present events. 
Moreover, even while an event is happening, the information perceived 
by one person may be very different than that perceived by others. 
Therefore, even if reliable markers for deliberate deception are 
discovered, they will not necessarily provide reliable information about 
past events. 
“After decades of concerted effort on the part of neuroscientists, 
psychologists, and philosophers, only one proposition about how the 
brain makes us conscious—how it gives rise to sensation, feeling, 
subjectivity—has emerged unchallenged: we don’t have a clue.”3 
INTRODUCTION 
or a few weeks in February 2015, consumers of popular culture 
were treated to a compelling example of how difficult it is to draw 
a line between a false memory and a lie. It is a matter of recorded fact 
that “Lyin’ Brian” Williams was not in a helicopter hit by enemy fire 
twelve years ago, despite his frequent and public claims to the 
contrary.4 What has caught the public imagination, however, is whether 
Williams was acting with the intent to deceive his listeners (lying), or 
if he had convinced himself, at some point, that the event really 
happened. His words of apology suggest that he is no more sure of why 
 
3 ALVA NOË, OUT OF OUR HEADS: WHY YOU ARE NOT YOUR BRAIN, AND OTHER 
LESSONS FROM THE BIOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS xi (2009). 
4 Tom Kludt & Brian Stelter, How Brian Williams’ Iraq Story Changed, CNN: MONEY 
(Feb. 10, 2015, 9:33 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/05/media/brian-williams-iraq        
-timeline/. 
F
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he made those claims than we are.5 And Williams’s uncertainty is 
consistent with how the human brain is put together—neuroscience 
strongly suggests that, unlike a manuscript where it may always be 
possible to go back to an earlier draft, what we think of as memories 
appear in our minds as seamless wholes. 
Learner and Loewe, the team responsible for writing “I Remember 
It Well,” fully expected that those hearing their song would recognize 
the discrepancies between the memories of the two protagonists 
because they have had many similar experiences themselves. All of us 
may find that we believe that someone who should have been at a 
particular event, was, and on hearing the facts, go on to remember it 
differently.6 But what we cannot do, and what makes this such an 
important issue for the courtroom, is retain two memories at once or 
have an awareness that a memory has been changed. This is significant 
for making determinations of credibility in a court of law, or anywhere 
else, because a technology based on identifying physiological signs that 
an individual is being deliberately deceptive are of no help unless the 
individual involved is aware of what she is doing. 
This Article, therefore, looks critically at the latest iteration of 
forensic mindreading technology and puts its proponents’ claims in the 
context of how seamlessly we can lie to ourselves and, as a result, pass 
on misinformation to others. It begins by surveying opinions on 
neuroimaging’s potential to provide reliable and accurate 
determinations of whether an individual is being deliberately 
deceptive. It also examines claims that, in the future, neuroimaging will 
actively read the thoughts of a human being undergoing a brain scan. 
Part II continues by discussing the current custom for using 
neuroimaging technology in U.S. courts. It then analyzes the science 
behind neuroimaging, discussing the legal implications of adopting 
neuroimaging technology into trial practice and how neuroimaging 
compares to eyewitness testimony, polygraphy, and other forensic 
sciences. Part III then describes how neuroimaging technology cannot 
 
5 See Alessandra Stanley, Brian Williams, in Raw Form, Delivers an Apology on ‘Today,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/20/arts/television/brian          
-williams-in-raw-form-delivers-an-apology-on-today.html. 
6 See Mark Godsey, We Are Naturally Bad Sleuths.. and Frequently Fail to Find the 
Truth, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 25, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark 
-godsey/we-are-naturally-bad-sleuths_b_4159351.html (describing the common occurrence 
of mistaken identification based on eyewitness testimony, as experienced through Mark 
Godsey’s work with the Ohio Innocence Project). 
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replace the role of the fact finder, and in actuality creates potential for 
prejudice in legal proceedings outside of the courtroom as well. Part IV 
suggests that a moratorium similar to that placed on polygraphy would 
effectively eliminate the risks described in Part III. And, finally, Part V 
and the Conclusion give recommendations for the future of 
neuroimaging technology in the legal system. 
I 
THE MARKET FOR TRUTH-TELLING TECHNOLOGY 
Although it is well established law in both federal and state courts 
that “[a]n expert witness is not permitted to testify specifically to a 
witness’ credibility,”7 there is money to be made in selling “unbiased 
methods for the detection of deception and other information stored in 
the brain”8 to lawyers, corporations, governments, and suspicious 
spouses.9 As a result, several private companies have licensed software 
programs10 that claim to be able to translate the results of sophisticated 
brain imaging into reports that draw reliable conclusions about the 
thoughts of the person being scanned.11 Despite the best efforts of the 
companies seeking to market this method for forensic use, so far, no 
court in the United States has accepted these reports to assist finders of 
fact in their traditional duties of weighing the credibility of all the 
evidence put before it, whether physical or testimonial. 
Given the likelihood that pressure to admit this evidence will 
continue, it is imperative to the fair operation of the legal system that 
all involved understand the claims made for the latest in a long line of 
failed technologies, including polygraphy and phrenology, which have 
similarly promised to unlock the mysteries of the human mind. This 
Article considers the issue of fairness in the context of the current legal 
 
7 United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 506 (9th Cir. 1989). 
8 NO LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
9 See Detecting Lies with fMRI, NEUROSCIENTIFICALLY CHALLENGED (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.neuroscientificallychallenged.com/blog/detecting-lies-with-fmri. 
10 See Matt Wall, Which fMRI Analysis Software (SPM, BrainVoyager, FSL)?, 
COMPUTING FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS (May 3, 2011), https://computingforpsychologists 
.wordpress.com/2011/05/03/which-fmri-analysis-software-spm-brainvoyager-fsl/. 
11 See Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie 
Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359, 360–61 (2007). The 
technology is often called “fMRI imaging,” but since the fMRI is merely a piece of medical 
equipment which produces the data the software analyzes, this is no more specific than 
calling any item cooked in or on a stove “stove.” Some have suggested that the term 
“Neurotechnological Lie Detection” be used to describe the general process, see, e.g., id. at 
360, as opposed to specific proprietary software that interprets the information that a 
Functional Magnetic Imaging Machine produces. 
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concerns being raised about the use of all forensic technologies in the 
courtroom and in particular about those raised by evidence based on 
human memory. 
This Article’s title directly reflects a phenomenon, well recognized 
by cognitive sciences, which we have all experienced: different people 
can remember the same event in very different ways. The lyrics of the 
song, “I Remember It Well” reflect a conversation between two old 
lovers about the first time they met.12 The male character confidently 
recounts details about the season, location, and even color of his 
partner’s dress which she equally confidently disputes based on her 
own memory.13 What is so significant about the song, and the 
phenomenon, is that rather than claiming to have forgotten the details 
or even to be engaging in what would be a fruitless exercise of making 
them up to appease his partner, the male is as confident that he is 
recounting facts about their first meeting as the woman is about 
contradicting them.14 But they cannot both be correct, can they? 
The problem here is one of heuristics. So long as the brain, acting as 
a digital camera where information from the senses is stored intact for 
future retrieval, is convinced, we will continue to overvalue the role of 
memory as we offer it to aid fact finders in the courtroom and elsewhere 
whether through oral testimony or imaging of brain activity. This 
Article seeks to change the paradigm of fact finding by rejecting the 
camera heuristic. Instead, by bringing together current scientific and 
legal writings, this Article demonstrates that what we now describe as 
the act of lying, in the sense of deliberately misinforming a jury, is 
closely related to how human brains process information about the past. 
As a result, any technology that claims to bypass volitional 
deception is misleading, suggesting that there is some form of objective 
truth obscured by a deliberate lie. Once these claims are understood, 
the technology can be evaluated in the context of contemporary legal 
standards for admitting evidence based on forensic scientific 
technologies in general and in particular of admitting testimony which 
relies on the content of human memory. There is a gap in scholarship 
that this Article will fill, explaining the limitations of the current 
 
12 Maurice Chevalier, I Remember It Well (from “Gigi”), MUSIXMATCH, https://www 
.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Maurice-Chevalier/I-Remember-It-Well-from-%22Gigi%22 (last 
updated Dec. 19, 2014) (providing the lyrics to Lerner and Loewe’s 1958 song). 
13 Id. 
14 See id. 
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technology to accurately and reliably produce useful information, and 
that these limitations are based on reasons inherent to all methods 
dependent on human memory. 
Reliance on a technology that reads memories assumes that the 
witness or defendant being questioned has available to him an 
unfiltered depiction of events so that his answers either accurately and 
honestly do reflect what happened or, through deliberate efforts to 
deceive, do not. In the context of the technology based on 
neuroimaging currently being offered as a way of assisting fact finders, 
this means two things. First, if a machine with one hundred percent 
accuracy and reliability could detect deliberate deception, it would 
absolve witnesses of accusations that they are lying. Second, however, 
even a far more sophisticated technology, which although not available 
now might well be in the near future, that could actually translate brain 
activity so that an external observer could see what the subject is 
remembering, would not be equivalent to reviewing a closed circuit 
video recording of the event. 
The current understanding of how the brain works, which is all we 
have to assess the usefulness of neuroimaging technology as a forensic 
tool, suggests that when his memory is of a gold dress and hers of a 
blue one; only one of them is correct, and it is a jury’s job to resolve 
the dispute should it reach them. Then, the jury must look at all the 
available external evidence, perhaps there is a dry cleaning receipt, to 
determine which party is correct. 
Could there be uses for a technology that accurately reflects the 
thoughts as the thinker perceives them? Yes, but not in the context of 
evidence admitted at a trial. Perhaps flawed information would be 
better than none in the face of a non-communicative subject and the 
need to find a ticking bomb or a stolen child. However, even an 
accurate record of a memory will reflect only the subjective 
impressions of the eyewitness.15 
 
15 See Brian R. Gallini, Police “Science” in the Interrogation Room: Seventy Years of 
Pseudo-Psychological Interrogation Methods to Obtain Inadmissible Confessions, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 529, 570–71 & n.337 (2010). For the purpose of making its argument that 
direct access to thought would not bring more accurate information to the jury, this Article 
accepts the claim that it is possible to define “lying.” The Reid Institute advertises that it has 
developed an interview technique which “permit[s] evaluation of a person’s truthfulness 
independent from a polygraph examination.” Critics Corner: The Reid Technique, JOHN E. 
REID & ASSOCS., INC., http://www.reid.com/educational_info/critictechnique.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2016). Its promotional website claims that “[t]his procedure, termed a 
Behavior Analysis Interview, has become a standard investigative technique, especially 
since the passage of the Federal Employee Polygraph Act of 1988, which greatly restricts a 
private employer’s use of polygraph.” Id. Although its sales materials claim to provide 
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Moreover, a lack of consensus among scientists as to whether juries 
are unduly swayed when presented with information based on forensic 
science16 supports a call for special caution in offering conclusions 
about whether or not a witness is being actively deceptive. This is 
because jurors are well aware of their human limits to knowing the 
contents of another’s thoughts and could well overvalue the findings of 
a machine that claims extra-human abilities.17 Thus, it would be a 
mistake to offer fact finders evidence from a machine which purports 
to know the contents of a person’s thoughts without a much better 
understanding of how successfully our brains can fool any of us into 
the conviction that we remember something in the face of direct 
contradiction of someone else who was there. 
A. The Innocence Project 
The Innocence Project is a nonprofit organization founded to “assist 
prisoners who could be proven innocent through DNA testing.”18 In 
the course of its work, the Innocence Project has concluded that 
eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful 
convictions nationwide, “playing a role in more than 70% of 
convictions overturned through DNA testing.”19 It is currently engaged 
 
citations to cases where courts have endorsed its technique, see Legal Updates, JOHN E. 
REID & ASSOCS., INC., http://www.reid.com/educational_info/r_updates.html#rt (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2016), in fact these are cases where courts have admitted confessions 
obtained using the “Reid Technique” because they do not constitute illegal methods of 
interrogation, not because they endorse crediting the confessions with any enhanced 
reliability or accuracy, see, e.g., State v. Myers, 596 S.E.2d 488, 492 (S.C. 2004). 
16 See generally Mark A. Godsey & Marie Alou, She Blinded Me with Science: Wrongful 
Convictions and the “Reverse CSI-Effect,” 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 481 (2011) 
(discussing two ways forensic evidence can wrongly influence a jury). 
17 Cf. United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014) (“There are several 
reasons for the prohibition against expert testimony on other witness’ credibility. Such 
testimony: (1) ‘usurps a critical function of the jury’; (2) ‘is not helpful to the jury, which 
can make its own determination of credibility’; and (3) when provided by ‘impressively 
qualified experts on the credibility of other witnesses is prejudicial and unduly influences 
the jury.’”) (quoting United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993)); United 
States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Absent unusual circumstances, 
expert medical testimony concerning the truthfulness or credibility of a witness is 
inadmissible. . . . because it invades the jury’s province to make credibility determinations.” 
(citation omitted)). 
18 Our Work, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
19 Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org 
/causes-wrongful-conviction/eyewitness-misidentification (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
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in a nationwide advocacy effort to change the law.20 The Innocence 
Project’s primary evidence for the unreliability of the eyewitness 
testimony as obtained in lineups and presented to juries in court is 
based on brain science. One Innocence Project website explains that: 
As far back as the late 1800s, experts have known that eyewitness 
identification is all-too-susceptible to error, and that scientific study 
should guide reforms for identification procedures. . . . Since then, 
hundreds of scientific studies (particularly in the last three decades) 
have affirmed that eyewitness identification is often inaccurate—and 
that it can be made more accurate by implementing specific 
identification reforms.21 
The scientific studies of memory on which the Innocence Project 
bases its claim for the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony should be 
seen as strong evidence against the use of information obtained through 
neuroimaging technology because this evidence, too, is based on 
memory. Although it has been represented as a new forensic 
technology that provides unique access to information stored inside the 
human brain, in fact it is no more than a method of accessing memory. 
B. Closed Circuit Video’s Ability to Solve Crimes Without Assessing 
Witness Credibility 
Companies offering to provide analysis of neuroimaging data as a 
way to directly access the thoughts of a potentially unwilling or 
deceptive subject often make an analogy to the kind of video 
surveillance that has become almost universal in public places in Great 
Britain, where it plays a major role in solving crimes.22 American 
viewers of contemporary British television shows like MI-523 and 
Torchwood24 are often surprised that the first step in almost any 
investigation is to “find” or “roll” the Closed Circuit Video (CCV or 
 
20 Improve the Law, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free                
-innocent/improve-the-law/legislative-reform (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
21 Eyewitness Misidentification, MIDWEST INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://themip.org 
/eyewitness-misidentification/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
22 Beginning with a massive public project in the 1990s most public space in Great 
Britain is within the view of constantly running closed circuit video cameras. See Clive 
Norris & Michael McCahill, CCTV: Beyond Penal Modernism?, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
97, 100–02 (2006). For a general description of how CCV is being used for law enforcement, 
see id. 
23 For discussion of an episode of MI-5, see Vicky Frost, Spooks: Series Nine, Episode 
Three, GUARDIAN: TV & RADIO BLOG (Oct. 4, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://www.guardian.co 
.uk/tv-and-radio/tvandradioblog/2010/oct/04/spooks-series-nine-episode-three. 
24 For a guide to Torchwood episodes, see Torchwood: Episodes, BBC, http://www.bbc 
.co.uk/programmes/b006m8ln/episodes/guide (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
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CCTV) tape. Once accessed, an agent runs it through the computer 
which provides an identification.25 There is never, on television at 
least, any need to find witnesses, let alone extract a confession from the 
suspect. The police merely track the person down, arrest him, and play 
the tape for the jury.26 
II 
THE VALUE AND RELIABILITY OF NEUROIMAGING TECHNOLOGY 
The power of the claims made by fMRI technology is particularly 
dangerous due to both the subjectivity of human memory and the lure 
of a technology that purports to reveal thought. There is no scientific 
explanation for how thinking occurs, let alone where in the brain the 
process occurs.27 Although it has been described as a technology that 
allows outsiders to “watch [the brain] think[ing],”28 in fact there is no 
scientific consensus on what thinking is or where it occurs, let alone 
whether it can be watched. That is why commentators have criticized 
the colorful, moving images produced from the digital data as 
deceptive.29 
 
25 Facial recognition software has become so commonplace that it is now available in 
many phone applications. See, e.g., Orbeus, Inc., PhotoTime – Automatic Face Sorting & 
Keyword Tagging for Your Moments, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app 
/phototime-automatic-face-sorting/id846435251?mt=8 (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). It is 
possible for a person to take a picture of a stranger and have the software search the Internet 
for publicly available information and produce a name, telephone number, and address 
within seconds. Facial Recognition Phone Application Described as a ‘Stalker’s Dream,’ 
DAILY MAIL (Mar. 1, 2010, 1:02 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1254537 
/Facial-recognition-phone-application-described-stalkers-dream.html. It is currently being 
used to screen passengers in British airports. Owen Bowcott, Face Scans for Air Passengers 
to Begin in UK This Summer, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.guardian 
.co.uk/business/2008/apr/25/theairlineindustry.transport. 
26 But see Grant Fredericks, Can Video Evidence Be Trusted?, EVIDENCE TECH. MAG., 
May–June 2010, at 10, 10–14 (explaining why “video can no longer be accepted at face 
value”). In fact, skepticism is growing in Great Britain as to whether pervasive recording 
actually does either deter crime or make it easier to solve. See id. One reason for this is that 
like all other forensic evidence recordings produced by CCTV cameras need to be 
interpreted by experts. Id. 
27 See Adina Roskies, Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility, 10 
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIS. 419, 420 (2006). 
28 AM. PSYCHOLOLOGICAL ASS’N, FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING: A 
NEW RESEARCH TOOL 6 (2007). 
29 E.g., George J. Annas, Forward: Imagining a New Era of Neuroimaging, Neuroethics, 
and Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 163, 167 (2007). In an introduction to a symposium 
issue on brain imaging and the law conducted by the American Journal of Law & Medicine, 
an issue frequently cited in this Article, Professor George Annas identified specifically, in 
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Technology based on neuroimaging is being offered to the legal 
system as a way of providing investigators30 and juries31 direct access 
to the minds of witnesses. In the short term, this access purports to 
assess credibility and in the long term to extract information.32 The 
claims of direct access to the human mind have excited those involved 
in law enforcement and the justice system who seek to avoid the 
 
the context of footage of Terri Schiavo appearing to smile, that “[i]t is . . . the immediacy 
and seeming infallibility of pictures that make them simultaneously valuable and dangerous” 
which many contributors to the symposium issue identified as why brain imaging 
technology had the particular potential to “provide vivid and compelling, but simultaneously 
misleading, information.” Id. (citing Laura Khoshbin & Shahram Khosbin, Imaging the 
Mind, Minding the Image—An Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 
AM. J.L. & MED. 171 (2007); and then citing Joseph Baskin et al., A Picture is Worth a 
Thousand Words: The Role of Neuroimaging in the Courts, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239 (2007)). 
30 The “identification” claims being made for fMRI are based on the premise that there 
were consistent patterns of brain activity when a person sees something they recognize. 
Thus, investigators could tell if an individual had ever been to a particular place or seen a 
person or object. See infra Part II.B (discussing limitations of this matching). The other 
claim is that like fingerprints, each brain has unique features which can establish identity. 
See generally JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL 
DEFENSE (2006). 
31 See Customers – Lawyers, NO LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/customers/Lawyers 
.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2016) (“The purpose of the justice system is to find the truth. No 
Lie MRI test results could be used in a similar manner to DNA testing by adding the 
verification of an individual’s mental record. It would also potentially be possible for a 
witness to validate his or her own statements to the court.”); Customers – Government, NO 
LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/customers/Government.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2016) 
(The website explains how its technology would be of benefit to foreign governments, its 
promotional website states that “[f]or developing countries where government corruption is 
a serious problem, accurate lie detection would be of tremendous benefit for rooting out 
corrupt individuals. This would enable trust to be placed in the governmental and economic 
systems of these countries, encourage greater foreign capital investments to be made, and 
thus spur modernization of these countries.”). 
32 See JOHN MEDINA, BRAIN RULES: 12 PRINCIPLES FOR SURVIVING AND THRIVING AT 
WORK, HOME, AND SCHOOL 67 (2008). John Medina in his accessible account of current 
research based knowledge of how the human brain functions describes a neurosurgeon 
spending up to three hours before every operation “mapping” the location of functions like 
speech or motor function in each individual patient because “no two brains are wired 
identically.” Id. at 65. He continues to explain that this kind of research done by stimulating 
specific points on a person’s brain while he is awake has resulted in a finding that each of 
our brains has a specific neuron that corresponds to specific memories or experiences we 
have had. Id. at 65–66. This finding led to the much publicized finding that for one subject 
one specific neuron responded only, and reliably, to a picture of Halle Berry, another to a 
picture of Jennifer Aniston, and another to Bill Clinton. Id. at 60–62. The import of these 
findings are that for that individual, the firing of that specific neuron was an indication that 
he was thinking about one of these people. Id. at 61–62. Therefore, it is impossible on an 
individual basis to create a brain map that would be able to identify what a person is thinking 
at a specific time. Id. at 61. 
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uncertainties of human efforts to distinguish truth-telling from lying.33 
Unfortunately, the same scientists making these claims stand to benefit 
directly from substantial licensing fees if this technology is adopted in 
U.S. courts.34 
Additionally, one of the core difficulties with using any method of 
lie detection is the lack of a common definition of “lying.”35 As 
explained below, what neuroimaging technology is really doing is not 
so much detecting lying as it is accessing the memory of past events. 
 
33 See, e.g., Note, Admitting Doubt: A New Standard for Scientific Evidence, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 2021, 2029–30 & n.57 (2010) (citing Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good 
Evidence? Lie Detection, Neuroscience, and the Mistaken Conflation of Legal and Scientific 
Norms, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191 (2010)). The Note described Schauer as “stating that 
juror assessment of witness testimony uses ‘alleged indicators of veracity [that] are at best 
highly unreliable, and at worst totally random,’ and arguing that this context makes it 
plausible that fMRI evidence, while far from perfect, could nevertheless increase accuracy.” 
Id. at 2030 n.57 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
34 Adi Narayan, The fMRI Brain Scan: A Better Lie Detector?, TIME (July 20, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911546-1,00.html. Asked about the 
potential value of a technology that could reliably identify deception, Stanford Professor 
Hank Greely, the leading legal scholar writing on fMRI technology as a truth-testing 
machine, told Time Magazine “that if fMRI lie detection became admissible in court, the 
industry could easily be worth more than a billion dollars per year.” Id. Although he does 
not believe that the technology is sufficiently developed he explains that the potential pay 
off makes it worthwhile for the companies to keep trying to get fMRI evidence admitted. 
See id. He said, “It’s a big country, there are lots of judges out there and I think they are 
hoping to find one who will allow the evidence, particularly if the other side doesn’t know 
much . . . . To be able to use [fMRI lie detection] in court would be the blue ribbon, the 
license to print money.” Id. (second alteration in original). 
35 DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 
43 (2012). “[P]rofessor Richard Leo explains, ‘no physiological or psychological response 
unique to lying (and never present in truthfulness) has ever been discovered.’” Id. “Thus, 
the theory of the Behavior Analysis Interview remains implausible, especially vulnerable to 
interpreter bias, and open to doubts about its validity and false positives.” Id. (commenting 
on the admissibility of a police interrogation technique called the “Behavior Analysis 
Interview”). The marketers of Behavior Analysis Interview advertise it as being “a non-
accusatory interview designed to identify whether or not a person is telling the truth or 
withholding relevant information concerning a specific crime or act of wrongdoing. The 
interview has proven to be very effective when there are many possible suspects and no 
evidence pointing to a particular person.” Behavior Analysis Interview, JOHN E. REID & 
ASSOCS., INC., https://www.reid.com/services/r_behavior.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
The Reid Institute advertises that it has developed an interview technique which “permit[s] 
evaluation of a person’s truthfulness independent from a polygraph examination.” Critics 
Corner: The Reid Technique, supra note 15. 
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To know that one actually committed a crime that one is denying, it is 
necessary to remember that event.36 
A. The Current State of Neuroimaging Technology in U.S. Courts 
There is, so far, no documented case of neuroimaging evidence 
being accepted as evidence in a U.S. courtroom for the purpose of 
assessing the truthfulness of the witness’s testimony. However, 
neuroimaging evidence is a familiar technology in criminal courts 
where brain scans are admitted to support diagnoses of mental illness 
or impairment.37 Nevertheless, a court in Brooklyn, New York, 
specifically rejected the introduction of the results of an fMRI scan 
because it was offered “to show that a witness . . . was telling the truth 
about the details of the case.”38 
Although its use has been limited in U.S. courts, there is increasing 
anecdotal evidence of information from neuroimaging scans used as a 
tool for truth verification in overseas courts.39 In India, for example, 
there were three murder trials where neuroimaging scans were used, 
and in all three the defendants were convicted.40 
 
36 See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (P.M.S. 
Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 4th 
ed. 2009) (1953). 
37 See Aaron Saenz, fMRI Used as Evidence in Sentencing for Murderer, 
SINGULARITYHUB (Dec. 2, 2009), http://singularityhub.com/2009/12/02/fmri-used-as          
-evidence-in-sentencing-for-murderer. Whether neuroimaging evidence should be used for 
the purpose is beyond the scope of this Article. Its diagnostic uses depend on an underlying 
conclusion that it is possible to diagnose mental illness by looking at a living brain. For a 
thoughtful review of how courts have analyzed the admissibility of PET and SPECT 
methodology, see Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the 
Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 233 (2006). For a 
discussion on the way different kinds of neuroimaging have been used to make claims about 
mental health or mental disability, see Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: 
Neuroimaging Evidence in the U.S. Courts, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 29 (2008). 
38 Alexis Madrigal, Brain Scan Evidence Rejected by Brooklyn Court, WIRED (May 5, 
2010, 5:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/05/fmri-in-court-update/ (discussing Wilson 
v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 2010)); see also Aaron Saenz, Another 
Attempt to Use fMRI Lie Detector in US Court Fails in Brooklyn. More on the Way., 
SingularityHUB (May 6, 2010), http://singularityhub.com/2010/05/06/another-attempt-to    
-use-fmri-lie-detector-in-us-court-fails-in-brooklyn-more-on-the-way/. 
39 Julie Seaman, Black Boxes: fMRI Lie Detection and the Role of the Jury, 42 AKRON 
L. REV. 931, 933 (2009) (discussing implications of a foolproof lie detector in the context 
of the jury’s role). 
40  See Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts is Debated, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/world/asia/15brainscan.html 
?pagewanted=all. 
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B. How Does Neuroimaging Work? 
The fMRI was developed to conduct the same kind of medical 
diagnostic testing as conventional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
and has also been used to diagnose brain injuries and, more 
controversially, even mental illness.41 However, fMRI’s ability to 
capture real-time information42 of brain activity in order to draw 
conclusions about the origins of human behavior has caught the 
attention of a wide range of social science researchers studying buying 
habits43 and investing.44 One of the companies selling fMRI 
technology for use in the courtroom claims that it “provides unbiased 
methods for the detection of deception and other information stored in 
the brain.”45 No Lie MRI’s promotional material explains that the 
technology does so by “[b]ypass[ing] conscious cognitive processing” 
and “represents the first and only direct measure of truth verification 
and lie detection in human history.”46 This statement goes far beyond 
any made by scientists in any peer-reviewed publication. Indeed, the 
basic criticism of fMRI technology as a method of reading thoughts is 
that there is disagreement among scientists as to what is actually 
recorded.47 No one claims to actually observe the direct action of 
neurons as they fire. To compound the difficulty, there is no generally 
agreed upon definition of “thought,” let alone a theory on its 
 
41 See Oguz Demirci et al., A Review of Challenges in the Use of fMRI for Disease 
Classification / Characterization and A Projection Pursuit Application from Multi-site fMRI 
Schizophrenia Study, 2 BRAIN IMAGING & BEHAV. 147, 147 (2008) (“There is much hope 
that fMRI data can be used to characterize and/or classify brain disorders such as 
Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia, mild traumatic brain injury, addiction or bipolar 
disorder using the biologically measured quantity.”); Doron Gothelf et al., The Contribution 
of Novel Brain Imaging Techniques to Understanding the Neurobiology of Mental 
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 11 MENTAL RETARDATION & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REVS. 331, 337 (2005) (describing the difficulties 
with using fMRI for the mentally retarded); Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of 
Interrogation Jurisprudence?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 341, 341–42 (2007). 
42 Bradley P. Sutton et al., Current Trends and Challenges in MRI Acquisitions to 
Investigate Brain Function, 73 INT’L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 33, 33 (2009). 
43 See, e.g., Gerhard Raab et al., A Neurological Study of Compulsive Buying Behaviour, 
34 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 401, 401 (2011). 
44 See, e.g., Richard L. Peterson, The Neuroscience of Investing: FMRI of the Reward 
System, 67 BRAIN RES. BULL. 391, 391 (2005). 
45 NO LIE MRI, supra note 8. 
46 Id. 
47 See D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-
Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 727 (2002). 
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physiological basis.48 Researchers making claims for fMRI believe that 
blood flows to the part of the brain required to address a specific task. 
Under this construct, it is possible to identify the part of the brain 
engaged in an activity by measuring blood flow.49 For example, when 
a person speaks, blood flows to the part of the brain associated with 
speaking. The basic task of fMRI research, then, is to give human 
subjects specific tasks, such as to think about someone you love, and 
measure where the blood goes.50 
The inventor of the process now used for analyzing these readings, 
Lawrence Farwell, made the comparatively modest claim that brain 
activity was unique to each individual and that these scans could be 
used as a tool for identification, labeling it “brain fingerprinting.”51 
Like fingerprint analysis, analysis of brain imaging data is a process of 
finding unique patterns that can be used to identify each individual.52 
Farwell’s brain fingerprinting, however, goes far beyond confirming 
identity. He claims that a specific pattern of brain activity can be 
correlated with having a memory of a specific location or incident.53 In 
that way, it does not detect lying at all. Rather, it detects information 
stored in the brain. If someone has committed a crime, they have a 
record of that in their brain, and the probe can detect if they have the 
details of a specific crime stored in their mind.54 The idea of using the 
technology to detect lies is based on the results of experiments that 
show recognizable and consistent patterns among subjects who are 
 
48 Leroy Cronin et al., The Imitation Game—A Computational Chemical Approach to 
Recognizing Life, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1203, 1204 (2006). 
49 See Daniel D. Langleben et al., True Lies: Delusions and Lie-Detection Technology, 
34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 351, 357 (2006) (“Since deception is a cognitive phenomenon that 
takes place in the brain, the potential of the [measurement of blood pressure, skin 
conductance, heart rate, and breathing] in a lie-detection system is theoretically inferior to 
the more proximal, central nervous system (CNS) correlates of brain activity that could be 
obtained by EEG and fMRI.”). 
50 See Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Lie Detection: Is a 
“Brainstorm” Heading Toward the “Gatekeeper”?, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 36 
(2007); Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional 
Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1119, 1138–39 (2010). 
51 Polly Shulman, Liar Liar Pants on Fire, POPULAR SCI. (July 24, 2002), http://www 
.popsci.com/scitech/article/2002-07/liar-liar-pants-fire (recounting the history of 1991 
experiments done by Farwell and his then advisor Emanuel Donchin that identified patterns 
in brain responses to familiar objects embedded among unfamiliar ones). 
52 See id. 
53 See Lawrence A. Farwell et al., Farwell Brain Fingerprinting in the Case of Harrington 
v. State, BRAINWAVE SCI. 7, 7, http://www.brainwavescience.com/Farwell_Brain_Finger 
printing_in_Harrington_v_State.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
54 See id. at 8. 
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asked to engage in deliberate deception—such as misidentifying a card 
they are holding.55 
Many people are involved in the process of using neuroimaging for 
the courtroom. First, just as a crime scene technician must be trained to 
retrieve blood samples without contaminating them, neuroimaging data 
cannot be obtained without a trained technician actually operating the 
scanning equipment.56 This aspect of neuroimaging is no different 
from what would be required for anyone undergoing diagnostic testing. 
However, for forensic purposes, it is not enough to merely operate the 
scanning equipment. In the case of fMRI data, the digital recording, 
which are called pulses, must first be entered into a computer and then 
analyzed by software which matches the location of blood flow with 
predetermined maps of the brain’s areas of specialization.57 It can then 
be matched to a timed transcript of an interrogation to create a record 
of what happened when the subject was asked a specific question.58 
Those findings are then interpreted by a cognitive scientist.59 So, if 
after many experiments, it turns out that every time a person lies, blood 
flows to one particular area, software analyzing fMRI data can identify 
blood flow to that area in future scans as evidence of lying.60 
The software used to analyze and interpret neuroimaging data is 
mathematically complex as well as proprietary.61 In order to enter 
evidence of conclusions about veracity based on this data, the 
 
55 See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for 
Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739, 740 n.2 (2009). One of the most difficult tasks in discussing 
“deception” is defining it. Writing about the Neuroscience, Law & Government Symposium 
held in 2008 at the University of Akron, Professor Jane Campbell Moriarty explains that 
“adequately defining the concept of deception is more complicated and outcome-
determining than one might imagine: is it uttering false words, responding misleadingly to 
requests to push one button or another, or simply attempting to think untrue thoughts on 
demand?” Id. at 740. She goes on to suggest that in order to effectively address the use of 
neuroimaging in the courts, “perhaps another focus needs to be not on deception, but on 
what we mean by truth.” Id. 
56 Matt A. Bernstein, How to do a STRUCTURAL Multicenter Neuroimaging Study 2, 
http://cds.ismrm.org/protected/09MProceedings/files/Mon%20C35_02%20Bernstein.pdf 
(unpublished class materials, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, MN) (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
57 Id. at 1. 
58 Steve Silberman, Don’t Even Think About Lying, WIRED (Jan. 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2006/01/lying/. 
59 See id. 
60 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 50, at 1138–39. 
61 See, e.g., Benjamin Martin Bly et al., The RUMBA Software: Tools for Neuroimaging 
Data Analysis, 2 NEUROINFORMATICS 71, 71 (2004). 
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proponent would have to offer it through expert testimony.62 Every step 
in the process adds additional expense so that it is unlikely that the 
defense in a criminal trial could afford to either run their own test or 
even hire their own expert to review the conclusions drawn by the 
State’s expert.63 
What this software does, moreover, is far different and more 
subjective than image-enhancing software, for example, which allows 
greater resolution from digital pictures by employing mathematical 
formulas.64 It seems as though the task for the software developer 
would be to create a program to analyze the frequency with which 
certain behaviors, such as deception or non-deception, correlate to 
externally confirmable facts. To do that, she must study the results of 
research experiments in which subjects are induced to lie while their 
brains are being scanned. For the software to have any value, it must 
find an identifiable digital signal that occurs every time someone lies. 
There is nothing unusual about analyzing evidence collected at a 
crime scene using pattern recognition. But whether the testing process 
involves analysis of data or matching of dental records, what is 
presented to the jury is usually an expert’s interpretation of the analysis, 
not the data itself.65 There are two major concerns with all forensic 
tests. First, there is no reason to believe that what fMRI scans measure 
while a person is engaged in a specific behavior is attributable to the 
act of deliberate deception.66 
Second, cognitive scientists and mathematicians must work together 
in order to establish parameters for reaching their conclusions;67 
specifically, they must define what constitutes deception and assign it 
 
62 See United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 523 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that expert 
testimony regarding fMRI evidence was properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 
702). 
63 For a general overview of the wide repercussions of under-funding the public defense 
system, see KATE TAYLOR, JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF 
UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE (July 2011). 
64 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 50, at 1138–43. 
65 See Adam Deitch, Comment, An Inconvenient Tooth: Forensic Odontology Is an 
Inadmissible Junk Science When It Is Used to “Match” Teeth to Bitemarks in Skin, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 1205, 1232–33 (explaining why bitemark testimony is not reliable but is still 
harmful because bitemark-matching testimony, like polygraph evidence, is “draped in an 
‘aura of scientific precision and objective measurement’” (quoting State v. Dean, 307 
N.W.2d 628, 633 (Wis. 1981))). 
66 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 50, at 1160–63. 
67 See generally Daniel Andler, Mathematics in Cognitive Science, in PROBABILITIES, 
LAWS, AND STRUCTURES 363 (Dennis Dieks et al. eds., 2012). 
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a value.68 The problem is that each scan generates a tremendous 
amount of data.69 As a recent paper explained, there is often so much 
data generated that it overwhelms the software intended to recognize 
patterns that indicate deception.70 
C. The Lure of Truth-Verification Technology 
Analysis of data obtained by fMRI machines has captured the 
imagination of the popular press. The magazine Popular Mechanics 
has already adopted the definition of neuroimaging as a mind-reading 
process by describing a scientist watching the results of an experiment 
as “peering into another man’s mind.”71 It is just this kind of rhetoric 
that leads people to believe neuroimaging is a useful tool for the 
courtroom. 
Despite No Lie’s claims about the technology’s role in overturning 
a conviction in Iowa, it has not yet actually been presented directly to 
a court that then used the results as the basis of a decision.72 Unlike the 
 
68 See Karuna Meda, fMRI Lie Detection: Is There Science Behind Deception?, J. YOUNG 
INVESTIGATORS (Sept. 2009), http://www.jyi.org/issue/fmri-lie-detection-is-there-science    
-behind-deception/ (“[T]he fMRI does not measure two important components of lying- the 
emotional response and the intention of the liar’ [sic] to instill false belief in another 
person.”). 
69 Bo Jin et al., Feature Selection for fMRI-based Deception Detection, BMC 
BIOINFORMATICS 2–3 (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC27 
45686/pdf/1471-2105-10-S9-S15.pdf. 
70 See id. at 2 (identifying one of the first steps in developing algorithms to correlate 
deception with specific brain activity was to find a way of selecting a limited sample of the 
data that still resulted in a high rate of successfully detecting deception). 
71 Jeff Wise, Thought Police: How Brain Scans Could Invade Your Private Life, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 14, 2007, 8:00 PM), http://www.popularmechanics.com 
/science/health/nueroscience/4226614. 
72 But see Brain Fingerprinting Labs., Inc., Iowa Supreme Court Reverses Harrington 
Murder Conviction After 24 Years, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 26, 2003), http://www.prnewswire 
.com/news-releases/iowa-supreme-court-reverses-harrington-murder-conviction-after-24    
-years-74496007.html. Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories (BFL), owned and operated by Dr. 
Lawrence Farwell, claims not only that his technology has already been admitted into court 
for the purpose of verifying the testimony of a man wrongfully accused of murder, but that 
it was the basis of a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court to overturn the man’s conviction. 
Id. The reality is less dramatic. The headline of BFL’s press release is dramatic, “Iowa 
Supreme Court Reverses Harrington Murder Conviction after 24 Years,” id., but not entirely 
accurate if the suggestion is that the defendant was freed based on brain fingerprinting. 
Although the Iowa Supreme Court did overturn the wrongful conviction, it did not do so 
based on the information from Dr. Farwell’s brain fingerprinting. See Harrington v. State, 
659 N.W.2d 509, 525 (Iowa 2003). Moreover, the question of whether or not the trial court 
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scientists and businessmen who tout the brain imaging technology in 
its current state of development as ready for courtroom use, scholars in 
law and ethics are far more cautious.73 From the earliest calls for 
caution by Hank Greely to the more nuanced criticisms of why the 
current data is insufficient to support any claims of reliability, many 
academics have expressed their doubts and concerns.74 
The criticism takes several forms; some is purely concerned with the 
fact that the findings are based on the current technology subject to 
substantial limitations.75 Other critics question the constitutionality of 
forcing an individual to involuntarily incriminate himself.76 
Nikos Logothetis issued a forceful call for caution in the journal 
Nature after claiming that his data collected from brain scans done on 
monkeys had been stolen and misinterpreted by two former graduate-
student laboratory assistants to indicate that neuroimaging could 
accurately identify human deception.77 Logothetis wrote that: 
 
should have allowed the brain fingerprinting information into evidence was not an issue 
before the court. See id. at 512. 
73 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 50, at 1134–35 (arguing that fMRI has not yet shown 
the level of reliability necessary to assess the state of mind of a criminal defendant at the 
time of the crime); Brian Reese, Comment, Using fMRI as a Lie Detector – Are We Lying 
to Ourselves?, 19 ALB. L.J.  SCI. & TECH. 205, 223–24 (2009). Brian Reese emphasizes that 
even if the existing studies could be interpreted to detect deception at an acceptable rate, 
there are so many different sub-populations on which it has not been tested as to make its 
use completely unacceptable. See id. at 219–26. 
74 See, e.g., Brown & Murphy, supra note 50, at 1206 (“[U]ntil fMRI is able to reliably 
capture past mental states, this evidence should not be admissible for such purposes either 
under FRE 403 or under local standards for admissibility of scientific evidence.”). 
75 See George M. Dery, Lying Eyes: Constitutional Implications of New Thermal Imaging 
Lie Detection Technology, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 217, 242–49 (2004) (weighing the 
constitutional concerns raised by thermal lie detectors); Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan 
D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 286–91 (2007) (discussing the 
inappropriateness of fMRI to establish a causal connection). 
76 See Dov Fox, The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control, 42 AKRON L. REV. 
763, 763–64 (2009) (examining the idea that individuals have a moral and constitutional 
right of control over the use of their own thoughts); Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 11, at 375 
(evaluating whether neurotechnological lie detection is likely to be covered under the Fifth 
Amendment privilege). But see Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, 
and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 305 (2006) (“[T]here is nothing uniquely 
problematic about the proposed neuroscience evidence, and that its compelled production 
falls within core concepts and doctrines of both the Fourth Amendment and the Self-
Incrimination Clause . . . .”). 
77 Alison Abbott, Neuroscientist: My Data Published Without Authorization are 
‘Misleading,’ NATURE (July 2, 2008), http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080702/full/454 
006a.html. 
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The limitations of fMRI are not related to physics or poor 
engineering, and are unlikely to be resolved by increasing the 
sophistication and power of the scanners; they are instead due to the 
circuitry and functional organization of the brain, as well as to 
inappropriate experimental protocols that ignore this organization.78 
Commenting on his Logothetis’s gloomy prediction, Jonah Lehrer, 
a highly successful populizer of science, translated the words from 
science to plain English: 
 Although brain scanner technology is often described as a 
“window into the brain,” Logothetis, in this most recent article, 
makes it clear that the metaphor of transparency is inappropriate. He 
cites a long list of factors that complicate the interpretation of fMRI 
data, from the challenge of distinguishing between excitation and 
inhibition to the difficulty of measuring the relative activation of 
different brain areas.79 
Lehrer concluded by warning, “[i]f brain scanners are like a window, 
then the window has some very dirty glass.”80 
There are two kinds of claims made for using brain imaging 
software, one relatively narrow and one quite broad. The narrow claim 
now being made by the companies marketing this technology is that it 
can, with greater accuracy than a polygraph machine, assess in real-
time whether an individual answering questions is providing truthful 
information.81 Specifically, one company claims, “The technology 
used by No Lie MRI represents the first and only direct measure of 
truth verification and lie detection in human history!”82 
The broader claim goes beyond evaluating veracity to actually 
reading thoughts. As one article describes it, “Soon, the technology 
could go even further, pulling back the curtain guarding our most 
private selves. Indeed, boosters say, a nearly foolproof lie detector 
based on brain scanning is just around the corner.”83 
Scientific literature has only one common point of agreement when 
discussing a correlation between fMRI results and specific thoughts or 
emotions: much more experimenting needs to be done before 
 
78 Jonah Lehrer, Science, Criticism, fMRI, SCIENCEBLOGS: THE FRONTAL CORTEX (June 
24, 2008), http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2008/06/24/science-criticism-fmri/. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See, e.g., NO LIE MRI, supra note 8. 
82 Id. 
83 Wise, supra note 71. 
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concluding that that it is possible to reliably identify specific 
thoughts.84 In addition, the test subjects tend to be the usual subjects of 
scientific study—college students who are unlikely to match the 
population of criminal defendants on whom this technology would 
someday be used.85 The last, and very serious, criticism is that I believe 
that the data now available was obtained under ideal laboratory 
conditions and may therefore be inapplicable when the subject is 
someone actually being accused of a crime. As in any medical scan, the 
subject must lay still for the length of the interrogation.86 Although this 
could be stressful for anyone, there is no baseline for its effect on 
criminal defendants. 
While these studies are beyond the scope of this Article because they 
look to explain or predict human behavior but do not seek to impose 
prison sentences on those scanned, the criticisms they have engendered 
for overstating their results are relevant to an understanding of fMRI’s 
reliability as a lie detector.87 In fact, scientists do not know what about 
the brain makes magnetic energy react as it does, nor do they claim to 
 
84 See, e.g., Tancredi & Brodie, supra note 75, at 293–94 (reviewing the claims made as 
to the ability to diagnose mental disability using fMRI technology from a psychitric 
perspective and pointing out the technology’s limits as a reliable method of predicting future 
behavior). 
85 For example, the prestigious magazine Science reported that a federal magistrate judge 
in Tennessee rejected the introduction of fMRI evidence by the defendant who was indicted 
for making three million dollars in false Medicaid and Medicare billings. Greg Miller, fMRI 
Lie Detection Fails a Legal Test, 328 SCIENCE 1336, 1336 (2010). The defendant wanted to 
introduce the fMRI evidence to show he had no intent of defrauding the government. Greg 
Miller, Can Brain Scans Detect Lying? Exclusive New Details from Court Hearing, 
SCIENCE (May 14, 2010, 12:09PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/2010/05/can-brain-scans    
-detect-lying-exclusive-new-details-court-hearing. Although there is no published opinion, 
the magistrate issued a twenty-nine page report and Science published an account by a 
cognitive scientist who attended the hearing. See id. (interviewing cognitive neuroscientist 
Martha Farah). Marcus Raichle, a neuroimaging expert who testified, noted that among the 
evidence heard by the judge was that the findings on the defendant were not reliable because 
the defendant was “in his 60s when the scans were taken, considerably older than the 18- to 
50-year-old subjects who participated in the published studies.” Id. 
86 See Reese, supra note 73, at 223 (“Detecting deception through the use of fMRI will 
also prove difficult in people who have suffered some sort of brain injury during their 
lifetime. There are two ways that this type of damage can occur: physical trauma or 
mental/emotional trauma.”). The issue is not just one of willingness to lay still and subject 
one’s mind to magnetic pulses, but also the ability to do so. Brian Reese does an excellent 
job of surveying the populations who could not be candidates for neuroimaging because of 
their inability to do this. See id. at 219–27. 
87 See, e.g., Edward Vul et al., Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, 
Personality, and Social Cognition, 4 J. ASS’N PSYCHOL. SCI. 274, 285 (2009). 
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observe the actual activity of neurons firing in response to events 
happening outside the body.88 
Not surprisingly, neuroscientists’ claims for neuroimaging are far 
more modest than those of the commercial companies trying to sell it. 
The strongest scientific claim for fMRI is its ability to detect deliberate 
deception under controlled laboratory conditions.89 For example, a 
research team reported that they were eighty-six percent successful in 
replicating earlier studies that determined when subjects were being 
deliberately deceptive.90 Since the ability to replicate results is the 
“gold-standard” of the scientific method, this achievement was 
important, and I believe that their conclusion that their methodology 
“is robust” was justified. But so was their cautious conclusion that “this 
study provides further support for the feasibility of using fMRI to detect 
deception.”91 Despite this hopeful outlook, no independent scientist or 
legal scholar has put forward the position that, in its current state of 
development, contemporary neuroimaging technology is a reliable 
method of determining whether someone is telling the truth.92 
Analyzing fMRI results is based on observing a phenomenon like 
waves crashing on a beach and deducing its causation. A rough analogy 
might be throwing stones into a deep well. One can be sure that the 
noise following each tossed stone is caused by the stone. One can also 
make very accurate measurements of the time intervals between tossing 
the stone and hearing the noise. But, this knowledge is not the same as 
knowing the precise nature of the substance it is hitting. Even if there 
were a generally accepted understanding of the accuracy and reliability 
of conclusions drawn from fMRI data, it would either be so negative 
no one would ever use it, or so deceptive that the famously innumerate 
American public, jurors, judges, and lawyers could not accurately 
 
88 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 50, at 1138–39. 
89 See F. Andrew Kozel et al., Replication of Functional MRI Detection of Deception, 2 
OPEN FORENSIC SCI. J. 6, 8 (2009). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
92 See, e.g., WALTER GLANNON, BIOETHICS AND THE BRAIN 63–64 (2007) (warning of 
the practical limits of fMRI technology and technology’s general tendency to wrongly 
seduce a member of the public); Jennifer S. Bard, Learning from Law’s Past: A Call for 
Caution in Incorporating New Innovations in Neuroscience, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 73, 73 
(2007) (calling for caution in rushing into complete reliance on neuroimaging as a tool for 
investigation or trial); Daniel V. Meegan, Neuroimaging Techniques for Memory Detection: 
Scientific, Ethical, and Legal Issues, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 9, 9 (2008) (describing forensic 
use of neuroimaging as not a lie detector test but rather a memory detection technique). 
BARD (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2016  11:51 AM 
318 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94, 295 
evaluate the information they were given because of the technology’s 
appeal. 
D. Neuroimaging as a Forensic Science 
The general term “forensic science” describes techniques to analyze 
evidence in order to assist juries in the United States reach conclusions 
about the factual events in cases before them.93 The most commonly 
used forensic sciences are essentially matching techniques in which 
fingerprints, bullets, clothing, blood, and other substances found at a 
crime scene or on a victim are matched with samples taken from the 
defendant.94 Many states define “forensic evidence” more specifically 
in statutes, which describe what forensic evidence can be admitted and 
how it must be collected and analyzed.95 Conclusions offered to a jury 
about a witness’s veracity that are based on analysis of information 
collected through neuroimaging fall under this category and thus must 
be considered as a new type of forensic science. 
As a group of noted experts recently explained, the entire field of 
forensic science is being subject to considerable debate and review.96 
As they write, “For roughly a hundred years, these comparison and 
identification methods have regularly and routinely been employed as 
legal evidence. For most of that period, courts, attorneys, jurors, and 
the public, as well as forensic analysts themselves, have largely 
accepted this evidence as trustworthy and uncontroversial.”97 
However, during the past several years, “the situation has changed 
dramatically. These methods and techniques now face more criticism 
and scrutiny than ever before.”98 
Much of this criticism and scrutiny is represented in a 2009 report 
by the National Research Council and the National Academy of 
 
93 See What is Forensic Science?, AM. ACAD. FORENSIC SCIS., http://www.aafs.org 
/students/choosing-a-career/what-is-forensic-science/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2016) (“Any 
science used for the purposes of the law is a forensic science.” (emphasis omitted)). 
94 See Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need For a Research Culture in the Forensic 
Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 726 (2011). 
95 See, e.g., 8 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1507-29 (2015) (“‘Forensic Medical Evidence’ 
means evidence collected by medical or law enforcement personnel using a sexual assault 
evidence collection kit (or components thereof) consistent with state/national collection 
standards.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.20 (2014) (setting forth the “forensic analysis 
admissible as evidence”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35(a)(4) (West 2013) 
(defining “forensic analysis”). 
96 See Mnookin et al., supra note 94, at 725–26. 
97 Id. at 726. 
98 Id. at 727. 
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Sciences (NAS).99 The NAS report reviewed the evidence analysis 
methods currently in use, outlined the extensive body of criticism that 
has developed as to their accuracy and reliability, and made substantial 
recommendations for future reforms.100 In general, the NAS report 
found that the evidence being introduced into U.S. courts purporting to 
offer useful scientific evidence had an inadequate research basis and 
recommended extensive reforms to how such information should, in 
the future, be brought before juries.101 Acknowledging that what an 
fMRI is recording is “not a direct measure of neural activity,” the 
Oxford Center can only make the relatively weak claim that “fMRI is 
still a causal step closer to what is happening in the brain than the 
behavioral correlates psychologists have traditionally depended on.”102 
“Although currently qualitative, [f]MRI is a more objective measure of 
a person’s mental state than a tick-box questionnaire.”103 While 
perhaps good grounds to keep researching in a promising area, it is 
hardly a basis for replacing the jury system with a magnetic scanner. 
One of the substantial concerns about using neuroimaging data to 
assist the fact finder in assessing credibility is the risk that the jury will 
defer to its conclusions rather than exercise independent judgment.104 
 
99 See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NAS Report]. 
100 Id. at 14–33. 
101 For a current overview of the NAS report and its relation to contemporary forensic 
practices, see Mnookin, supra note 94, at 729; Michael J. Saks et al., Model Prevention and 
Remedy of Erroneous Convictions Act, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 669, 698–702 (2001) (proposing 
reforms which would reduce bias in the collection, analysis, and presentation of evidence 
produced by forensic scientific techniques). 
102 How is FMRI Used?, NUFFIELD DEP’T CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES, http://www.ndcn 
.ox.ac.uk/divisions/fmrib/what-is-fmri/how-is-fmri-used (last visited Feb. 10, 2016); see 
also OXFORD CTR. FOR NEUROETHICS, http://www.neuroethics.ox.ac.uk/ (last visited Feb. 
10, 2016) (“Established in January 2009, The Oxford Centre for Neuroethics aims to address 
concerns about the effects neuroscience and neurotechnologies will have on various aspects 
of human life.”). 
103 How is FMRI Used?, supra note 102. 
104 See United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 523–24 (6th Cir. 2012) (reinforcing that 
under Rule 403, a court may “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury . . . .”). It is not only 
the finder of fact who is likely to be unfamiliar with the science at the trial. Lawyers too 
may find themselves unwilling or, because of time, unable to fully understand the basis of 
the technologies used by their experts. See Pat A. Wertheim, Elements of Expert Testimony, 
CRIMES & CLUES (Jan. 31, 2013), http://crimeandclues.com/2013/01/31/elements-of-expert 
-testimony/. As Wertheim explains in her article intended to instruct fingerprint examiners 
how to testify in court, 
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The human fascination with separating truth from falsehood has a long 
history.105 
1. Contemporary Law for Admitting Forensic Evidence in the U.S. 
Because thought and memory are both human constructs, 
technology which purports to surpass the jury’s own ability to weigh 
information and testimony can meet neither Federal Rule of Evidence 
403’s requirement that all evidence presented to a jury be more 
probative than prejudicial, nor FRE 702, which requires that expert 
scientific testimony must be reliable.106 
The right to a fair trial is the starting point of legal analysis of 
forensic evidence admittance in the United States.107 All evidence rules 
in U.S. courts must adhere to and uphold the protections granted by the 
Constitution, which are intended to provide a fair trial.108 One 
mechanism for providing a fair trial is the convening of an impartial 
jury.109 All the factual determinations are made by the jury based on 
 
 Ideally, the calling attorney should follow a logical sequence in asking his 
questions. In reality, however, he or she may be unfamiliar with your science or 
with introducing expert testimony. If you cannot have a pretrial conference with 
the attorney, it helps to go to court with a suggested list of questions. Most 
attorneys are grateful for the help and will use your questions. 
Id. 
105 See generally Paul V. Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection, 29 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 848 (1939). 
106 See FED. R. EVID. 403, 702; Charles Patrick Ewing, Expert Testimony: Law and 
Practice, in 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 55, 59 (Alan M. 
Goldstein et al. eds., 2003) (explaining that expert testimony is available for subjects beyond 
a jury’s “ken”). 
107 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) (“The Constitution 
guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of 
a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the 
Counsel Clause.” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984))). The 
Sixth Amendment provides the following: 
 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
108 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (construing and 
applying Rule 702 to mean that a “trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable”). 
109 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (stating that the right to a 
jury trial “is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our 
constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the 
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information presented to it in the form of evidence.110 The substance 
of this evidence is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence as 
interpreted by the trial judge. I view the jury’s role in a criminal trial is 
to come to a collective decision about whether or not the defendant 
meets the legal standards for being held responsible for the crime with 
which the State has charged him. They are there to decide the facts, 
which, in the adversary system, often involves choosing between 
conflicting opinions of what really happened.111 Both the testimony of 
witnesses with firsthand information and physical objects like weapons 
constitute evidence. The law recognizes that sometimes the jury needs 
help in understanding the significance of the evidence it hears.112 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 therefore allows people with 
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” to give the jury 
their opinion if their testimony “will help the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”113 The expert’s role is as 
an advisor, and the jury does not have to accept his or her opinion as 
fact.114 Rather, each juror is entitled to make an assessment of the 
expert’s credibility.115 It is the judge, not either party, who decides 
whether or not a jury needs assistance; if so, whether the expert offered 
is qualified to give it; and, if the expert is qualified, whether the basis 
for the expert’s testimony is reliable.116 
 
legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the 
judiciary”). 
110 United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) 
(“Beyond all question, the common law [referred to in the Seventh Amendment] is not the 
common law of any individual state . . . but it is the common law of England, the grand 
reservoir of all our jurisprudence.”). 
111 Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348 (1981). 
112 See Anthony Champagne et al., Expert Witnesses in the Courts: An Empirical 
Examination, 76 JUDICATURE 5, 5 (1992). 
113 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
114 See PAUL R. RICE, THE EVIDENCE PROJECT, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO EXPERT 
WITNESS RULES IN THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RESULTS OF A JUDICIAL SURVEY 
(1998) (“The rule was premised on the belief that jurors would relegate their independent 
fact finding role to the expert by accepting his conclusions without independently analyzing 
their bases or applying the relevant scientific or technological principles.”). 
115 United States v. Cisneros, 203 F.3d 333, 343 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Credibility 
determinations are the exclusive province of the jury.”); David E. Seidelson, Conditional 
Relevancy and Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1048, 1059 (1979). 
116 Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 744 (1999) 
(“Rule 702, as well as Rules 401, 403, and 703, place the trial judge in the role of a 
gatekeeper who bars certain expert evidence.”). 
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,117 the first modern case 
involving the introduction of forensic scientific evidence to reach the 
U.S. Supreme Court, showed the Court to be well aware of the 
problems inherent in offering evidence intended to surpass the jury’s 
collective ability to assess credibility.118 Later, when confronted with 
a request to use the results of a polygraph exam as evidence of a 
defendant’s lack of truthfulness, the Court held in Frye v. United States 
that forensic scientific evidence had to be generally accepted as 
reliable, and the results of polygraph examinations did not meet this 
standard.119 What came to be described as the Frye standard was the 
test for admitting forensic scientific evidence in federal courts for the 
next seventy years, and it is still the test used in many states.120 
Trial judges’ authority has changed due to Daubert. Following the 
Court’s decision in Daubert, Congress amended FRE 702. It now 
states: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise, if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on 
sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case.121 
2. How General Criticisms of Forensic Science Today Apply to 
Neuroimaging Technology 
Reviewing the current state of forensic science being offered in U.S. 
courts, an observer noted, “The nature of science itself, and the fact that 
 
117 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
118 See Daniel D. Blinka, Why Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 
357, 410–11 (2010). This is especially troublesome when the issue before the jury is one of 
witness credibility. As Blinka notes, “expert opinions on another witness’s accuracy are 
usually of little assistance and only invite the jury to substitute the expert’s credibility for 
that of a lay witness.” Id. at 417. 
119 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also NORMAN ANSLEY, 
ADMISSIBILITY OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES 1 (1978) (citing 
Frye, 293 F. 1013). 
120 David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General 
Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 386 (2001) (describing the history of the Frye rule 
and Daubert’s growing influence in Frye jurisdictions). 
121 FED. R. EVID. 702; accord Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) 
(finding that the language concerning “technical” reflects the Court’s extension of the 
Daubert standard beyond scientific and medical testimony to “technical testimony” such as 
that offered by engineers). 
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forensic science is a service mainly delivered by the government, 
makes solving its problems a real challenge. Science is complex, 
constantly in flux, and often subject to disagreement. Government is 
slow, resistant to change, and difficult to hold accountable.”122 
Many have described the years since the Supreme Court’s 
substantial reworking of the evidentiary standards for admission of 
expert testimony based on scientific findings as the start of a new era 
in which judges are taking an active role for the first time in evaluating 
the techniques and methods on which these experts rely.123 Scholars, 
such as Professor Margaret Berger, argue that whatever the Court may 
have originally intended in Daubert, these standards are being 
interpreted by lower federal courts and some state courts, as requiring 
courts to conduct their own evaluations of scientific techniques 
presented to them rather than rely on acceptance of the scientific 
techniques by others in the field.124 This new requirement to evaluate 
scientific evidence on its merits has led to what can be described as a 
re-evaluation of all forensic evidence, with many traditionally 
irreproachable or iconic fields, such as fingerprint identification, being 
revealed as unreliable.125 I offer a perhaps fanciful but descriptive 
analogy: it is as if the public’s faith in forensic science is increasing in 
proportion to the growing doubts by other stakeholders within the legal 
system: lawyers and judges. Professors David Caudill and Lewis 
LaRue contribute to this analysis of what might well be called 
disenchantment with forensic techniques in their book No Magic 
Wand: The Idealization of Science in Law, in which they describe and 
criticize society’s overestimation of science’s ability to solve 
 
122 JIM FISHER, FORENSICS UNDER FIRE: ARE BAD SCIENCE AND DUELING EXPERTS 
CORRUPTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE? 275 (2008). 
123 See Mara L. Merlino et al., Meeting the Challenges of the Daubert Trilogy: Refining 
and Redefining the Reliability of Forensic Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 417, 417–18 (2007) 
(surveying steps taken by forensic scientists to “respond[] to the questions about the 
reliability of their testimony” raised by judges who in response to “the Daubert trilogy have 
imposed more objective, stringent requirements (relevancy, legal sufficiency, and 
reliability) for the admissibility of some kinds of evidence which for seventy years had been 
considered admissible under the Frye decision’s general acceptance standard . . . .”). 
124 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
9, 10 (2d ed. 2000). 
125 See id. at 12; Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play 
or Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 775 (1998); Joseph Sanders et al., Legal 
Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & L. 139, 143 
(2002). 
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crimes.126 This new scrutiny of forensic science can also be described 
as lifting the curtain on what appeared to be all powerful examiners. 
What was “behind the curtain” turned out to be much worse than a 
small man projecting his voice. Worse, further scrutiny revealed that 
these technicians were not only far from impartial—some were actually 
deliberately falsifying information in order to induce convictions.127 
3. The CSI Effect on Presenting Forensic Evidence at Trial 
Whether it was the Supreme Court’s intent or not, Daubert has 
dramatically changed the process of introducing expert testimony. 
Many judges now feel obligated to look beyond the general acceptance 
of a forensic test and ask for information so they can directly assess its 
reliability.128 As a result, long-unquestioned and even iconic 
technologies are being reexamined and found wanting.129 
Paradoxically, just as forensic science has come under closer scrutiny 
by judges, the same forensic science seems to be more trusted by jurors, 
whose expectations are formed by a string of successful television 
programs in which forensic science is always available and inevitably 
infallible.130 It is questionable whether the “CSI effect” helps defense 
attorneys, because it raises juries’ expectations that the prosecution will 
produce forensic evidence, or the State’s case, because the jury has 
greater faith in whatever forensic evidence the prosecution does make 
available. The concerns it has raised, however, speak to the more 
general perception that juries will be inclined to substitute the 
testimony of scientific efforts for their own judgment. In terms of 
 
126 See generally DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE 
IDEALIZATION OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2006). Their book inspired a substantial response by 
legal scholars including a symposium sponsored by the Villanova Law Review in 2007. See 
Symposium, Expertise in the Courtroom: Scientists and Wizards, 52 VILL. L. REV. 679 
(2007). 
127 George Castelle, Lab Fraud: Lessons Learned from the ‘Fred Zain Affair,’ 
CHAMPION, May 1999, at 12, 12. 
128 See Sanders et al., supra note 125, at 143. 
129 See Merlino et al., supra note 123, at 417–18. 
130 See Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media 
and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (2009) (“[S]ome 
prosecutors have claimed that the CSI effect has altered another pillar of the criminal trial—
the standard of proof. They have claimed that jurors are now holding them to a higher 
standard of proof than the traditional ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard. In closing 
arguments, prosecutors have called this higher standard the ‘TV expectation.’” (emphasis in 
original)). 
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neuroimaging data, the worry is that juries will believe a machine’s 
evaluation of a witness’s veracity over their own.131 
One of the central concerns in writing about neuroimaging as a 
method of lie detection is whether the problem is limitations in the 
technology or whether it is a larger limitation of the task. To some 
extent, this Article addresses both by questioning the value to a jury of 
direct access to a witness’s thoughts. But given how far away 
neuroimaging is from transcribing thoughts in the way that an EKG is 
assumed to transcribe heart function, it is more helpful to look at the 
claims being made for it as a technology rather than at the entire 
endeavor of separating truth from lies. The difference between lie 
detecting and other forensic sciences which purport to make matches 
or analyze chemicals is that the information obtained from 
neuroimaging purports to distinguish witnesses who are telling the 
truth from those telling lies in a way that is beyond human ability, just 
as the microscope extends human ability to see at the molecular 
level.132 No amount of human application or energy can we believe, 
know beyond a reasonable doubt that someone is lying or certainly 
know what they are thinking at any specific time. 
Presenting such expert testimony to a jury in a U.S. court is a serious 
challenge to the jury’s essential function as fact finder because it 
suggests that there is technology superior to the jury’s own ability to 
evaluate the truthfulness of testimony. Therefore, in a climate where 
the claims made by all forensic sciences are being subjected to renewed 
scrutiny and criticism, there is even more reason for caution and 
concern about adding neuroimaging to the list of forensic sciences 
routinely offered in U.S. courts. 
 
131 See Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie 
Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1210 (2010). Here, there is a strong 
difference of opinion. Deriding the risk, Schauer writes, 
 This reliance on juror incompetence to justify excluding neuroscience evidence 
seems misplaced, however, or, at the very least, premature. . . . [T]he empirical 
evidence on jury overvaluation is decidedly mixed. Indeed, if we (and the 
neuroscientists) subjected the common claims of jury overvaluation to the same 
scrutiny that we subject scientific evidence, we might find that the alleged basis 
for excluding bad scientific evidence itself rests on less than ideal science. 
Id. at 1210–11. 
132 See, e.g., Karen J. Kelly et al., The Effect of Deception on Motor Cortex Excitability, 
4 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 570, 573–74 (2009) (using transcranial magnetic stimulation and 
finding hemispheric differences in motor cortex excitability where subjects answered 
deceptively about their favored sports team). 
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E. Constitutional Implications of Neuroimaging-Based Technologies 
Many of the concerns expressed about using fMRI reports at trial are 
whether they are constitutional.133 Putting aside the practical reality 
that no such technology exists, scholars argue that a technology which 
looks into people’s brains and reads their thoughts violates the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unlawful search or seizure,134 and the 
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination.135 
I argue that, additionally, further constitutional rights are at stake in 
the context of this debate. The U.S. Constitution also grants both civil 
and criminal litigants the right to a fair trial under the Sixth 
Amendment’s identification of necessary components of a criminal 
trial,136 the Seventh Amendment’s identification of necessary 
components of a civil trial,137 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
explicit right to a fair trial.138 The Seventh Amendment’s protections 
are a rare example of the Constitution’s involvement in disputes 
between two private citizens rather than between an individual and the 
government. The government takes upon itself the task of hearing 
private disputes and using state power to enforce judgments. Evidence 
rules, whether the FRE or those of an individual state, are the means of 
implementing the right to a fair trial provided in the Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
 
133 See generally Christopher Domin, Comment, Mitigating Evidence? The Admissibility 
of Polygraph Results in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1461 
(2010); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (2007). 
134 Benjamin Holley, It’s All in Your Head: Neurotechnological Lie Detection and the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 28 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 10–13 (2009) (discussing 
various forms of neurotechnological lie detection that may be used in criminal investigations 
in the future and examining situations in which constitutional questions implicated by their 
potential use, including Fourth and Fifth Amendment considerations). 
135 Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 11, at 364; Erich Taylor, Comment, A New Wave of 
Police Interrogation? “Brain Fingerprinting,” the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 287, 312 
(questioning whether current legal doctrines would limit the threat of brain fingerprinting 
and self-incrimination); see also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of Mind 
Reading, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 214, 248–53 (2013) (defending the constitutionality of 
mind-reading devices); Pardo, supra note 76, at 305. 
136 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Matthew Baptiste Holloway, Comment, One Image, 
One Thousand Incriminating Words: Images of Brain Activity and the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 141, 303–06 (2008) (detailing how 
information obtained through neuroimaging could violate the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination and therefore not be admissible as evidence in court). 
137 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (protecting the fairness of civil trials). 
138 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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1. The Confrontation Clause Post-Crawford 
Information obtained through analysis of neuroimaging can only 
reach a jury in a U.S. courtroom if introduced by a scientist qualified 
to interpret it.139 In order to do that, it must meet the requirements of 
the relevant jurisdiction’s laws of evidence for expert witness 
testimony or it cannot be offered to the jury as proof of guilt or 
innocence in a criminal case or liability in a civil one.140 
Juries in the United States hear about forensic evidence through 
expert testimony.141 Those seeking to introduce scientific evidence 
must be able to show how it overcomes the deficits courts have 
identified; it must be information sufficiently reliable as to exceed the 
jury’s own ability to detect deception.142 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington has 
certainly affected, if not ended, the practice of introducing forensic 
evidence through a written report rather than requiring the testimony of 
an expert to interpret the information.143 The Supreme Court addressed 
this attempt to evade Crawford when it held that forensic lab reports 
could not be introduced without the presence of an expert in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts.144 Yet, as the authors of an amicus brief in 
Melendez-Diaz wrote, forensic evidence is still admitted without expert 
testimony: “the lower courts are in sharp and irreconcilable conflict on 
this question.”145 
2. Fourth Amendment Concerns 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that: 
 
139 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993). 
140 See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
141 See generally Megan J. Erickson, Comment, Daubert’s Bipolar Treatment of 
Scientific Expert Testimony—From Frye’s Polygraph to Farwell’s Brain Fingerprinting, 55 
DRAKE L. REV. 763 (2007) (reviewing the development of the Supreme Court’s views on 
expert testimony by first providing an historical explanation of its rejection of polygraph 
evidence in Frye and then predicting how the Court would view neuroimaging evidence 
which, like polygraphs, purported to surpass the jury’s own ability to assess witness 
veracity). 
142 See Sanders et al., supra note 125, at 142. 
143 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
144 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009). 
145 Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 1, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 
(2009) (No. 07-591), 2007 WL 4287355. 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.146 
The Unreasonable Search or Seizure Clause, as it is often described, 
would only be implicated if an fMRI scan was performed without an 
individual’s consent after he was arrested. In Winston v. Lee, the 
Supreme Court refused to allow prosecutors to remove a bullet from a 
defendant’s chest, citing the balancing test it established in Schmerber 
v. California.147 The Schmerber test, as explained in Winston, requires 
that the State establish probable cause that the procedure is necessary, 
and, if so, it must consider “the extent to which the procedure may 
threaten the safety or health of the individual.”148 Because an fMRI 
scan does not, as currently understood, pose a danger from exposure to 
radiation for those experiencing it,149 the question would be whether 
being confined in the fMRI machine for the period of the test 
outweighed the probative value of the information. 
Because one of the factors the Court recognized in Winston is the 
probative value of the test itself, the absolute lack of evidence that 
fMRI scanning can accurately assess the veracity of unwilling 
participants, or that it can even be effectively conducted on subjects 
under restraint, would be a strong argument against compelling a 
defendant to undergo it. 
3. Fifth Amendment Concerns 
Even if there is a method for obtaining reliable results without the 
subject’s cooperation, it would most likely be inadmissible under the 
Fifth Amendment.150 Distinguishing between the admissibility of a 
blood alcohol level obtained by force and another obtained voluntarily, 
the Court wrote: 
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical evidence,’ for 
example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function 
 
146 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
147 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763 (1985) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966)). 
148 Id. at 761 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771). 
149 In fact, fMRI does not use radiation at all. fMRI Risks?, U. MANCHESTER, 
http://www.bbmh.manchester.ac.uk/resilience/fMRI/fMRIrisks/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
150 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. But see Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 11, at 364–74 
(evaluating whether neurotechnological lie detection is likely to be covered under the Fifth 
Amendment privilege). 
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during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses 
which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit to 
testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or 
innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or 
not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.151 
F. Why Mind Reading Is an Ineffective Method of Truth Detection 
Even if it were possible to directly access memories, the information 
obtained would be unreliable because it would be filtered through an 
individual’s own character and experiences. It would not, therefore, be 
a substantial improvement on the current jury system because what we 
ask of jurors is not a mechanical determination of who is or is not telling 
the truth, but rather is a holistic scaffold of facts on which to apply the 
relevant legal standards. 
One of neuroimaging’s strongest claims is that it can detect 
“recognition.” But how often would this be useful? In the case of a 
missing child whose picture has been distributed widely, would 
recognition by a stranger—let alone someone who knew the child—
add anything to the investigation? Would recognizing the face of a 
notorious terrorist or the President of the United States add anything to 
an investigation of a potential assassination attempt? 
It is dangerous to suggest that memory accessing technology now or 
ever will replace the role of the jury for two reasons. The first is 
because, as a practical matter, proof of even the basic claim that there 
are consistent markers for recognition are based on conditions in a 
laboratory that can never be reproduced in a courtroom because Brady 
v. Maryland guarantees defendants the right to know about and 
examine the evidence that will be used against them.152 Second, even 
if this fundamental constitutional right did not exist, I can think of very 
few situations where whether a defendant “recognizes” a piece of 
evidence or a place is meaningful, let alone dispositive. A local bar 
where a murder took place could trigger recognition in hundreds of 
people in the neighborhood. Although law professors in particular are 
skilled at inventing unlikely scenarios, one where no one but the 
defendant could recognize a piece of evidence is so rare as to be 
inconsequential. 
 
151 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. 
152 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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G. Neuroimaging Versus Eyewitness Testimony: The Limits of 
Neuroimaging as a Mind-Reading Technology 
In 1985, Tim Cole was a student at Texas Tech University.153 One 
night while he was buying pizza at a local restaurant, a detective 
approached him to ask questions.154 The detective later took a Polaroid 
picture of Tim Cole at his house.155 Shortly afterwards, unknown to 
Tim Cole, the police showed his picture along with five formal booking 
photos of young African American men to a young woman who had 
been raped near campus two weeks earlier.156 Tim Cole’s was the only 
picture where the man was looking into the camera.157 The account is 
that she “was immediately sure that Cole was her attacker, saying: 
‘That’s him.’”158 Even though the rapes on campus continued after Tim 
Cole’s arrest, he was tried for the assault on the victim who identified 
him and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.159 He died there 
of complications from an asthma attack in 1999.160 Moreover, in 1995, 
after the statute of limitations for the rape expired, another prisoner 
who had been convicted of similar rapes in the same area wrote a letter 
to prosecutors claiming he had committed the crimes.161 It was not until 
Tim Cole’s case was taken up by the Innocence Project that he was 
cleared based on both DNA evidence and the confession. He was 
posthumously exonerated on April 7, 2009.162 
What makes Tim Cole’s case so different is that the victim, who uses 
her name in public speeches, has become an advocate for awareness of 
the dangers of misidentification.163 Today, a statue of Tim Cole stands 
looking at the Texas Tech campus with the inscription “And Justice For 
 
153 Timothy Cole, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false       
-imprisonment/timothy-cole (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Sarah Rafique, Justice System Failed Tim Cole, Victim, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-
JOURNAL (Sept. 13, 2014, 11:46 PM), http://lubbockonline.com/local-news/2014-09-13 
/justice-system-failed-tim-cole-victim. 
157 Timothy Cole, supra note 153. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Rafique, supra note 156. 
161 Id. 
162 Timothy Cole, supra note 153. 
163 Id. See generally The Exonerated and the U.S. Supreme Court, GEO. L. (Feb. 26, 
2009, 12:30 PM), http://apps.law.georgetown.edu/webcasts/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=721. 
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All.”164 Tim Cole’s case, although more public than most, is not 
unusual. 
The legal community has long been aware of warnings from 
cognitive psychologists, such as Elizabeth Loftus, that both human 
thought and memory are constructs of the individual in which they 
occur.165 As Yale Law School Professor Steven B. Duke wrote in a 
2006 op-ed piece about a different case of wrongful identification, 
“wrongful imprisonment contains a lesson that has been told and retold 
thousands of times: Eyewitness identification of strangers is 
unreliable.”166 Indeed, this research is often cited to prevent the 
admission of “recovered memories” from witnesses who have 
undergone hypnosis or other memory-enhancing techniques.167 Courts 
hearing these cases almost routinely find this information unreliable 
regardless of the witness’s own belief in its veracity.168 Yet there seems 
 
164 Betsy Blaney, Associated Press, Statue of Tim Cole Dedicated in Lubbock, STAR-
TELEGRAM (Fort Worth) (Sept. 17, 2014, 10:20 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/news 
/local/community/fort-worth/article3873738.html. 
165 See generally ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1996); ELIZABETH 
LOFTUS, MEMORY: SURPRISING NEW INSIGHTS INTO HOW WE REMEMBER AND WHY WE 
FORGET (1980); ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED 
MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (1994); ELIZABETH 
LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE ACCUSED, THE 
EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL (1991). 
166 Steven B. Duke, Eyewitness Testimony Doesn’t Make It True, HARTFORD COURANT 
(June 11, 2006), http://articles.courant.com/2006-06-11/news/0606120550_1_eyewitness    
-identification-dna-evidence-dna-analysis. 
167 See John Doe76C vs. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 62-C9-06-003962, 
slip op. at 29–30 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 9, 2009) (order excluding expert testimony). Judges 
have routinely refused admission of recovered memory on the grounds that it has not been 
proved reliable. E.g., id. slip op. at 30 (“Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof . . . of 
showing that the theory of repressed and recovered memory is reliable and trustworthy based 
on well-recognized scientific principles because of the significant methodological flaws in 
the studies presented by plaintiff in support of that theory and the lack of any test to show 
reliability.”). There are several advocacy groups organized around opposition to crediting 
“recovered memory” including the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, to which 
Elizabeth Loftus is an advisor, whose newsletters serve as compendiums of research, court 
cases, and articles condemning the movement to recover lost memories. See About FMFS – 
Advisory Board Profiles, FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME FOUND., http://www.fmsfonline.org 
/?about=AdvisoryBoardProfiles (last updated Dec. 13, 2013). See generally FMSF 
Newsletter Archive, FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME FOUND., http://www.fmsfonline.org 
/index.php?newsletter=newsletterarchive (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
168 See Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, Eyewitness Confidence and the 
Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Memory for People, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS 
PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 377, 418 (Rod C.L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007). 
Research confirms that while confidence may correlate with accurate memory it is by no 
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to be little concern that information derived from neuroimaging relies 
on accessing exactly the same unreliable information: human memory. 
Much of the legal scholarship on forensic uses of fMRI-based 
technology stems from the strong call for caution in a 2007 article by 
Professor Hank Greely at Stanford, which identified many of the issues 
which continue to be troubling.169 Greely’s argument builds on the 
current calls for reform of the way in which eyewitness testimony is 
used in criminal trials. Attorneys involved with the Innocence Project 
and prominent legal scholars argue that the remarkable number of 
defendants convicted based on eyewitness testimony, but later 
acquitted upon analysis of DNA evidence, mandates a reform of photo 
and in-person line-ups to account for known factors which lead 
witnesses to misidentify those they have seen committing a crime with 
full confidence in their own memories.170 
There seems to be a continuing disconnect between neuroimaging 
technology’s claims and the understanding that “[m]emory . . . is 
adaptive and flexible.”171 This hard-won knowledge and deep 
skepticism seem to vanish in the face of news about scientific studies 
purporting to convert fMRI scanning data into lie detectors. Whatever 
information is extracted from neuroimaging will be far closer to dream 
and fantasy than to reliable facts on which to base either convictions or 
acquittals.172 
 
means a guarantee. Assessing the current state of memory research on the relationship 
between the witness’s confidence and the accuracy of her memory, psychologists Michael 
R. Leippe and Donna Eisenstadt write that: 
 Eyewitness confidence is a mixed bag. Properly assessed, it should not be 
ignored as a potential indicator of identification accuracy. On the other hand, it is 
overrated by the criminal justice system and by people in general. And, at its worst, 
it can be what Leippe (1995) referred to as a “miscue” that can cause miscarriages 
of justice. 
Id. at 418. 
169 Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need 
for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 420 (2007) (providing a comprehensive overview 
of legal regulation of lie detection technology, development of neuroscience based lie 
detection, and analysis of legal and ethical implications of these technologies being used in 
courtrooms). 
170 Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 19. 
171 Paul Kix, Making Memories, AM. WAY, Feb. 15, 2011, at 30, 30 (quoting Elizabeth 
Phelps). 
172 Cf. Owen Bowcott, CCTV Boom has Failed to Slash Crime, Say Police, GUARDIAN 
(May 6, 2008, 7:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/may/06/ukcrime1 
(reporting how recent information suggests that the promise of direct access to unfiltered 
recordings of events in process is not being realized even in CCV). 
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The testimony of an eyewitness is that person’s recounting of a 
memory. The promise of admitting evidence obtained from 
interpretation of fMRI scans is that it will be a more accurate method 
of distinguishing those telling the truth from those who are lying. Those 
promoting its usage suggest that this technology will essentially give 
access to CCV tapes in the brain, which scholars consider a definitive 
evaluation of eyewitness veracity, thereby definitively evaluating the 
veracity of a witness’s testimony.173 Those looking into the future 
promise that, in time, these brain images will move beyond their role 
as lie detectors and actually provide direct access to the images stored 
there.174 
Over thirty years of research “shows that the human mind is not like 
a tape recorder; we neither record events exactly as we see them, nor 
recall them . . . .”175 The writers of these words are not scientists but 
the founders of the Midwest Innocence Project, a group dedicated to 
proving the innocence of defendants convicted solely on the basis of 
eyewitness testimony.176 Started by Barry Scheck at Cardozo School 
 
173 See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public 
Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 1349 (2004). For further discussion of surveillance in the United States, see D.C.’s 
Camera System Should Focus on Emergencies, Not Daily Life, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. 
CTR. (Dec. 2005), http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/1205/default.html 
(expressing concern about increasing installation of CCV cameras in the District of 
Columbia for the purpose of crime surveillance). 
174 See generally Shinji Nishimoto et al., Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain 
Activity Evoked by Natural Movies, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1641, 1643–44 (2011). 
175 Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 19; see also Barbara Jean McAtlin, 
Eyewitness Identification – Hindrance to Justice?, JUSTICE: DENIED, http://www.justice 
denied.org/eyewitness.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
176 See Free the Innocent, MIDWEST INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://themip.org/free-the       
-innocent/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). The strongest advocates for publicizing the inherent 
unreliability of eyewitness testimony are those involved with the Innocence Project. The 
first paragraphs of the Midwest Innocence Project’s website repeat an argument often made 
in their books and court briefs: 
 Eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions 
nationwide, playing a role in more than 75% of convictions overturned through 
DNA testing. While eyewitness testimony can be persuasive evidence before a 
judge or jury, 30 years of strong social science research has proven that eyewitness 
identification is often unreliable. Research shows that the human mind is not like 
a tape recorder; we neither record events exactly as we see them, nor recall them 
like a tape that has been rewound. Instead, witness memory is like any other 
evidence at a crime scene; it must be preserved carefully and retrieved 
methodically, or it can be contaminated. 
Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 19. 
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of Law,177 the Innocence Project points to the overreliance on 
eyewitness testimony as the leading cause of wrongful convictions.178 
Criminal defense attorneys have strongly advocated for decreased 
reliance on eyewitness testimony for a long time.179 Their cause has 
gained strength due to the results of a growing national movement to 
review the cases of those convicted on the basis of identifications made 
before the widespread use of DNA evidence.180 The Innocence 
Project’s strongest arguments for limiting the use of eyewitness 
testimony are the hundreds of cases they have documented where a 
misidentification places suspicion on an innocent man who becomes 
entangled and eventually trapped in a case built on what turns out later 
to be a complete mistake.181 
Since it is likely that a technology as expensive as analyzing data 
from an fMRI scan will be used primarily by prosecutors to convict 
criminal defendants, the experience of the Innocence Project with the 
problem of false identification is important. The scientific literature on 
memory extends beyond vision to include memory of information read 
or heard.182 There are many instances in both criminal and civil law 
when people are asked to recount things they said, things they heard, 
and things they saw. For example, a police officer who testifies that the 
dying victim identified the defendant as her killer is recalling the 
conversation with the victim. 
1. Academic Critiques of Eyewitness Testimony 
The strongest voice in legal academia for incorporating scientific 
findings about the limitations of eyewitness testimony into judicial 
practice is Professor Sandra Guerra Thompson. Professor Thompson 
has reviewed and analyzed scientific literature on humans’ ability to 
remember what they have seen. While she notes that experiments on 
 
177 Our Work, supra note 18. 
178 Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 19. 
179 Id. 
180 See Duke, supra note 166; Parchangelo, “60 Minutes” Shows Unreliability of 
“Eyewitness” Testimony, RICHARDWANKE.COM (Mar. 13, 2009), http://richardwanke.com 
/2009/03/13/60-minutes-shows-unreliability-of-eyewitness-testimony/. 
181 See David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER 
(Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann 
?currentPage=all#ixzz0upr98NTK. The New Yorker reported that DNA evidence had 
exonerated 130 people on death row in the United States, but “Barry Scheck, a co-founder 
of the Innocence Project, which has used DNA testing to exonerate prisoners, estimates that 
about eighty per cent [sic] of felonies do not involve biological evidence.” Id. 
182 See generally, e.g., 1 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR 
EVENTS (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2007). 
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memory are documented over the past one hundred years, the first 
strong connection between the results of these studies and the actual 
task of eyewitness identification in a legal setting came in the 1970s 
with the work of Dr. Elizabeth Loftus.183 
Professor Thompson advocates for universal application of 
safeguards to prevent convictions based on false identifications by 
eyewitnesses, which she labels “system variables.”184 She writes 
forcefully that “[t]he fact that so many individuals are wrongly 
convicted based on eyewitness testimony proves that the criminal 
justice system as it currently operates fails to live up to the ideals of an 
adversarial system.”185 Specifically, she recommends that police 
departments be required to follow the corroboration requirement from 
the New York Judicial Council’s 1948 report, whether viewing live 
suspects or photographs.186 This requirement set out procedures to 
minimize practices which contaminate identification.187 
 
183 For an account of Dr. Loftus’s views on the malleability of memory in her own words, 
see this recording of a lecture entitled “What’s the Matter with Memory” given at the 
Chautauqua Institution. Chautauqua Inst., Elizabeth Loftus: What’s the Matter with 
Memory?, FORA.TV (July 14, 2009), http://library.fora.tv/2009/07/14/Elizabeth_Loftus 
_Whats_the_Matter_with_Memory. 
184 Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering 
Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1495–
96, 1499 (2008). Professor Thompson divides the problem of making the identification 
process more reliable into two parts: estimator variables and system variables. Id. at 1499. 
Estimator variables are factors relating to how “the human mind actually perceives events.” 
Id. at 1501. “What happens in front of the eyes is transformed inside the head, and [then] 
refined, revisited, restored, and embellished in a process as perpetual as life itself.” Id. 
(quoting BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND 
HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 55 (2003)). Another way of considering estimator variables is as 
factors occurring inside the brain. 
 Professor Thompson contrasts this with system variables, which she defines as “those 
factors affecting witness accuracy” occurring outside the witness’s brain and “that the legal 
system can control to some extent.” Id. at 1504. Her work and that of other legal scholars 
seeks to make systemic reform by implementing changes to the methods police use in order 
to reduce error rates. See id. at 1495–96. 
185 Id. at 1506. 
186 Id. at 1523–24. 
187 See id. at 1501 (quoting SCHECK ET AL., supra note 184, at 55). Should neuroimaging 
actually come into courtrooms as evidence of veracity, then it will be very important to have 
procedures already in place to avoid misinterpretation of the data. However, given how far 
current neuroimaging is from being ready for even limited introduction, the witness’s 
recollection and perception problems, or estimator variables, identified as contributing to 
the high error rate of eyewitness identification are inevitably present, regardless of how well 
neuroimaging is able to read actual memories. In fact, the better neuroimaging is at accessing 
actual memories, the more important it will be to understand how the brain’s inherent 
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2. The Role of Eyewitness Testimony in U.S. Trials 
Unfortunately, the heuristic of the brain as a camera is a strong one 
and is not easily dislodged. Professor Thompson has frequently 
expressed her frustration in the persistence of the legal system’s faith 
in eyewitness testimony, arguing that it is time for the U.S. legal system 
to recognize “the universally accepted scientific knowledge that 
eyewitnesses often misidentify strangers.”188 She recently studied a 
year’s worth of appellate cases in which defendants challenged their 
convictions based on faulty eyewitness testimony, and found that not 
only did none prevail on that issue, but that “many of the appellate 
opinions continue to view the eyewitness’s degree of certainty as an 
indicator of reliability.”189 The reliance Americans place on the 
account of events by people who were there is so deeply ingrained that 
it is difficult to extract for purposes of examination. Common phrases 
such as “I saw it with my own eyes” or “show me” are reflections of 
the primacy of the eyewitness. Moreover, it is not just firsthand sight 
that is privileged, but also firsthand hearing. The law of evidence is 
rigid in its insistence on the primacy of words recounted by those who 
heard them directly.190 While over time a body of exceptions has 
developed, the very word “hearsay” in the context of an objection to 
admitting evidence has become a proxy for “unreliable.”191 
 
process of recording and storing memories directly affects the forensic usefulness of the 
memory retrieved. 
188 Id. at 1544. The modern history of studying eyewitness testimony goes back at least 
hundreds of years. See Gary L. Wells & Lisa E. Hasel, Eyewitness Identification: Issues in 
Common Knowledge and Generalization, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 159, 159 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008) 
(“Long before forensic DNA testing was developed, psychological scientists were 
publishing articles warning that eyewitness identification evidence appears to be at once 
both highly persuasive to jurors yet highly subject to error. The interest of psychological 
scientists in eyewitness memory was clearly evidenced in the early part of the twentieth-
century in the writings of Munsterberg (1908). But, it was not until the 1970s that 
psychological scientists began to launch systematic experiments involving lineups.”). 
189 Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Blindness to Eyewitness Misidentification, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 639, 642 (2009). 
190 See FED. R. EVID. 801, 802 (defining hearsay and prohibiting its admission). See 
generally Peter Nicolas, ‘I’m Dying to Tell You What Happened’: The Admissibility of 
Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (2010) 
(tracing history of development of how dying declarations became acceptable exceptions to 
hearsay). 
191 See Ronald J. Allen, Response, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of 
Admission, 76 MINN. L. REV. 797, 798–800 (1992) (calling for the abolition of the hearsay 
doctrine because its increasing complexity has outweighed its usefulness). Professor Ronald 
Allen notes, “The rule imposes other costs as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and 
writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools, 
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While one might not immediately see eyewitness testimony as a 
technology, it is an excellent example of how reliance on human 
memories about what the eyes have seen has been discredited. Most 
law students have heard of Dr. Loftus’s work proving the inaccuracy 
of eyewitness testimony, and many have experienced classroom 
exercises in which a startling event is staged and the class afterwards is 
polled on what they saw. What is so interesting about these experiments 
is not so much what people do not notice, but what they believe they 
have seen which they have not. Study after study demonstrates that 
people are highly susceptible to believing they have seen something 
when they have not. Dr. Loftus makes her point in a study she described 
on 60 Minutes.192 Under the guise of a marketing survey, she and her 
team showed Disney World advertisements to people who had visited 
the theme park.193 The advertisements featured a Bugs Bunny 
character.194 After surveying them about their reactions to the ad, adult 
subjects were asked about their own experiences meeting Bugs Bunny 
at Disney World.195 As she explains, this could never have happened 
because Bugs Bunny is not a Disney character and would never have 
been allowed on the property.196 Remarkably, having seen the ad and 
being asked the question, the subjects were happy to provide specific 
memories in which they themselves had interacted with Bugs 
Bunny.197 
Given how common it is for people to hold good faith conflicting 
memories of events at which all were present, it is remarkable how 
much weight we put on the idea that there is only one truth. While it is 
common courtroom rhetoric to argue that, when two people remember 
a conversation differently, someone is lying, research over the past fifty 
years strongly suggests that both are telling what they consider to be 
the truth. If the promise of neuroimaging is that it provides direct access 
to the memory of a person with firsthand knowledge of an event, we 
need to consider what that means. 
 
students spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay 
rule . . . .” Id. at 800. 
192 CBS News, Exclusive: The Bunny Effect, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 2009), https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=eZlPzSeUDDw. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
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It would be unfortunate, but not unusual, for a forensic technique to 
deliver less than promised. Neuroimaging, however, is particularly 
dangerous because its promise taps into two human characteristics. The 
first is confidence in the reliability of our own and others’ memories. 
The second is the longing to uncover what we know is inaccessible to 
mere mortals: the thoughts of others. Part of this may be because we as 
individuals trust what we see. Scientists have found that feelings of 
confidence in identification or memory can be as strong or stronger 
when the identification is incorrect or the memory is false as when it is 
true. Indeed, as Professor Thompson points out, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has never revisited the test it developed in Mason v. 
Braithwaite,198 which specifically includes “the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation” even though it “has 
been roundly criticized” for not reconsidering “witness certainty” in 
light of current scientific beliefs.199 The Supreme Court has so far not 
recognized the need for any special screening of eyewitness testimony 
unless there is evidence of potentially prejudicial state action.200 
3. Outlook for the Future 
Regardless of whether memories are offered through direct 
statements or are extracted or evaluated via technology such as analysis 
of neuroimaging data, the underlying information being relied on is the 
same and is equally unreliable. The only effective method for 
preventing undue prejudice from testimony based on memory is for 
states and the federal government to pass laws which incorporate the 
findings which have been validated by eighty years of scientific 
research. Professor Thompson and others have advocated exactly this 
in promoting the adoption of the model guidelines,201 but the starkly 
pessimistic conclusion of the American Pyschological Association 
(APA)’s amicus curiae brief in Perry v. New Hampshire—that 
 
198 Sandra Guerra Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as Guardians 
Against Wrongful Convictions, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 608–09 (2010) (“Long before 
the advent of DNA evidence and the release of so many wrongly convicted people, a rich 
dialogue had existed in the jurisprudence of eyewitness identifications about the risks of 
misidentification and the role the courts should play in protecting the innocent.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
199 Thompson, supra note 189, at 659 (quoting in part Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 
199–200 (1972)). 
200 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720–21 (2012) (declining to find error in 
allowing a jury to evaluate eyewitness testimony directly, without any judicial prescreening, 
when there was no evidence of “improper law enforcement activity”). 
201 Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to 
Eyewitness Identification Reform, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 56 (2008). 
BARD (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2016  11:51 AM 
2016] “Ah Yes, I Remember It Well”: Why the Inherent Unreliability 339 
of Human Memory Makes Brain Imaging Technology a Poor Measure 
of Truth-Telling in the Courtroom 
“[t]raditional [t]ools [o]f [t]he [a]dversary [s]ystem [c]annot [b]e 
[r]elied [u]pon [t]o [o]vercome [t]he [p]rejudicial [e]ffect [o]f 
[i]ncorrect [e]yewitness [i]dentifications”202—calls for measures that 
set the terms under which it can be presented to the jury at all. 
The APA brief reviews the tools which have been suggested to 
mitigate the prejudice of inaccurate eyewitness testimony in light of the 
body of scientific evidence about the unreliability rate of eyewitness 
testimony and the tendency of jurors to find this type of testimony 
disproportionately convincing and then find each tool unacceptably 
ineffective.203 It starts with the premise supported by what it describes 
as “a seminal 1983 study” where subjects were shown “crime scenarios 
derived from previous empirical studies and asked . . . to predict the 
accuracy rate of eyewitness identifications observed in the studies.”204 
The researchers found that upon hearing that testimony was based on 
an eyewitness identification, subjects were significantly more likely to 
believe the testimony than not.205 The findings have been replicated, 
including in one study which found that mock juries presented with the 
same scenarios increased their “conviction rate . . . from 49 percent to 
68 percent when a single, vague eyewitness account was added to the 
circumstantial evidence described in a case summary.”206 
Starting from this premise, the APA reviewed cross-examination, 
cautionary jury instructions, and expert testimony on the inaccuracy of 
eyewitness testimony, and cited literature finding all of them 
ineffective in overcoming the initial predisposition to believe 
eyewitnesses.207 The evidence they cite is quite specific. For example, 
several studies have directly found that jurors who were given 
cautionary instructions on the reliability of eyewitness testimony were 
 
202 Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Petitioner 
at 17, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716 (No. 10-9874). 
203 Id. at 17–21. 
204 Id. at 17 (citing Jonah C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective 
Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 22–
24 (1983)). 
205 See id. at 17–18 (describing a study where subjects were shown scenarios describing 
the conditions under which the eyewitness made the observation and the characteristics of 
the witness and then made an assessment on how likely it was that this witness was correct). 
206 Id. at 18 (citing Jennifer N. Sigler & James V. Couch, Eyewitness Testimony and the 
Jury Verdict, 4 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 143, 146 (2002)). 
207 Id. at 18–21. 
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no more likely to identify factors which might make the testimony less 
reliable than were jurors who were not so instructed.208 
A just and effective law governing the use of information of 
eyewitnesses, whether obtained directly through testimony or 
indirectly through either current crude technology or any future 
method, which actually can accurately retrieve memories of specific 
events, must then take into account four principles developed through 
the vast body of scientific literature. First, that eyewitness testimony is 
inherently unreliable. Second, that there are known factors which make 
eyewitness testimony unreliable in general. Third, that witnesses are 
significantly more likely to make an inaccurate identification in a 
forensic setting when they see only one suspect. And fourth, jurors are 
already predisposed to “over believe” eyewitness testimony, thus 
amplifying its prejudicial effects if indeed it is incorrect. 
In light of these four factors, and especially in light of the persistence 
of the negative effect regardless of traditional methods of mitigating 
prejudicial evidence, juries should not be allowed to hear testimony 
based on their identification of a witness previously unknown to them 
unless it occurred in the context of an acceptable multi-subject line-up 
or picture array. To be effective, such an evidentiary rule would have 
to be based on facts, not intentions. Thus, the issue in Perry as to 
whether the police orchestrated the witnesses seeing the defendant 
standing with police at the crime scene would be irrelevant. Just as a 
search or seizure or confession can become irrevocably tainted the 
instant an illegal event occurs, so would the testimony of a witness who 
has not identified the defendant in a scientifically based fair context. 
Such a rule would avoid the need to make distinctions among the ways 
in which an unfair identification took place. It would not only prohibit 
prosecuting attorneys from orchestrating in-court identifications but 
would also hold them responsible should such an event occur 
spontaneously either through one of their witnesses or from any person 
present in the courtroom. The effect of a comprehensive rule would be 
to create an automatic mistrial whenever a jury hears an eyewitness 
identify a defendant, previously unknown to the jury without first 
having done so in a fair process supported by contemporary science. 
Although the solution proposed above is unlikely to be easily or 
quickly converted into law, the first step is a recognition that the debate 
 
208 Id. at 20 (citing Brian L. Cutler et al., Nonadversarial Methods for Improving Juror 
Sensitivity to Eyewitness Evidence, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1197, 1198–1200, 1202–
06 (1990)). 
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over the use of neuroimaging as a method of accessing or 
characterizing human thought is not one over technology. The debate 
is over introduction of memory-based information in a court of law 
given the demonstrated human tendency to overestimate both forensic 
technologies and eyewitness testimony. 
H. Conclusions Based on Data from fMRI Scans Share All the Flaws 
of Polygraphy 
Despite its early criticism, the polygraph is still very much in use 
and its results continue to be offered as evidence.209 The growing 
acceptance of polygraphy evidence for proof of veracity in state and 
even federal courts makes it even more important to understand the 
limits it shares with functional magnetic imaging. 
In its current stage, the claims made for neuroimaging as a truth 
verifier are similar to those once made for the polygraph in that it 
purports to provide a real-time assessment of statements by an 
individual human. This is in contrast to other techniques, like 
phrenology, which speak more to general character.210 
 
209 See Polygraph Litigation, ANTIPOLYGRAPH.ORG, https://antipolygraph.org/litigation 
.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). Much of the current literature critical of polygraph 
evidence is collected in the website of a private group called “Antipolygraph.org” which 
“seeks the complete abolishment of polygraph ‘testing’ from the American workplace.” 
Comprehensive Employee Polygraph Act, ANTIPOLYGRAPH.ORG, http://antipolygraph.org 
/ceppa.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). The group writes, “Now that the National Academy 
of Sciences has conducted an exhaustive study and found polygraph screening to be invalid, 
and even dangerous to national security, Congress should extend the protections of the 1988 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act to all Americans.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
210 See United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 249 (1987) (“At the bottom [of the scientific 
evidence hierarchy] lies a junk pile of contraptions, practices, techniques, etc., that have 
been so universally discredited that a trial judge may safely decline even to consider them, 
as a matter of law. To that level have been relegated such enterprises as phrenology, 
astrology, and voodoo. In the middle is that range of scientific and technical endeavor that 
can neither be accepted nor rejected out of hand. To this group, based on the information 
available to us, we assign the polygraph.”); 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
702.05[2][b] (Joseph M. McLaughlin et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997) (“The reliability requirement 
is designed to exclude so-called ‘junk science’—conjuring up memories of the phrenology 
craze where the bumps on a person’s head were felt in order to determine character traits—
from federal courts. At the very least, scientific opinions offered under Rule 702 must be 
based on sound scientific methods and valid procedures.”), quoted in Logerquist v. McVey, 
1 P.3d 113, 124 (2000); Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain 
Function: A Historical Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193, 195–208 (2007) (discussing the 
history of the development of the science of phrenology and its adoption and then rejection 
by the American legal system). 
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The Supreme Court’s rejection of the attempt to introduce polygraph 
information as evidence was so vehement that the resulting opinion, 
Frye v. United States, created the standard by which all scientific 
evidence was evaluated for use in the courtroom for the next seventy 
years until Daubert. The Court’s primary objection to introduction of 
the polygraph report was not based on its own assessment of 
polygraphy’s usefulness, but rather that the polygraph’s scientific 
reliability was not generally accepted by the scientific community.211 
It is useful to remember that polygraph evidence is not always 
offered as direct proof of the elements of the crime. In Mallory v. 
United States, the Court rejected a confession that was produced after 
the police arrested a number of individuals in the area where a rape had 
occurred, held them in the police station for over four hours, and then 
administered a polygraph.212 
Another way of assessing the limits of neuroimaging technology is 
to see how similar its limits are to those of polygraph and 
concomitantly how it has some even greater limitations than 
polygraphs. First, both technologies measure people’s own feelings 
about the information they are giving. If the person being questioned 
does not believe he or she is being deceptive, then the machine is 
unlikely to register deception. This is especially true when the question 
is targeted at a memory. For example, a question like “did you hurt the 
child?” asks for the examinee’s memory of the contact. Here, the issue 
will be the examinee’s belief based on his memory of the event. 
Because it is physically impossible to have a subject simultaneously 
undergoing neuroscanning and be effectively wired to a polygraph, any 
claim that neuroimaging is more accurate than polygraph must be based 
on comparisons of the results of different studies done at different 
times. Professionals who work in the field of polygraphy complain 
bitterly that this is completely unfair since the technology of both 
administering and analyzing polygraph data is constantly evolving and 
the results of past studies are not reflective of the accuracy of results 
available today.213 
 
211 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Andre A. Moenssens, 
Polygraph Test Results Meet Standards for Admissibility as Evidence, in LEGAL 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH 14 (Norman Ansley ed., 1975). 
212 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 450–51 (1957). 
213 For a survey of the development and historical use of polygraph technology, see 
generally Don Grubin & Lars Madsen, Lie Detection and the Polygraph: A Historical 
Review, 16 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 357 (2005). 
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The same ability to analyze data and report, for example, the 
frequency with which a particular feature is present, is used in 
analyzing neuroimaging data and polygraph data. What computers do 
when analyzing data is no more difficult than what a scientist could do 
for herself. The difference is the speed at which computers can do it. 
Science has been revolutionized by the development of computers that 
perform rapid calculations on large volumes of data. For example, it is 
one thing for even a highly trained examiner to study sets of fingerprint 
impressions, notice distinctive features, and compare them to other 
samples. But it is quite another for a computer to do the same thing 
with thousands or millions of samples. 
An important factor in the accuracy of the analysis is the amount of 
information available to analyze. Unlike polygraphs, as noted 
repeatedly by scientists urging caution in ascribing conclusions to 
neuroimaging data, the samples are very, very small.214 This is because 
neuroimaging equipment is large and expensive.215 
Another difference is the ability to attract subjects and the 
characterizations of the subjects who are willing to participate. While 
neither neuroimaging nor polygraphy is physically painful, the former 
is far more uncomfortable than the latter.216 In fact, one of the 
drawbacks of all magnetic resonance imaging is the number of people 
who cannot physically tolerate the claustrophobia of lying still in a very 
tight metal tube for forty-five minutes. While a polygraph researcher 
can bring his equipment to a prison or even a retirement home and in a 
few days acquire many data sets to analyze, this is impossible given the 
physical characteristics of fMRI equipment. However, polygraphy’s 
appeal is so strong that, despite being banned from use in federal court 
because it is likely to “mislead” the jury, faith in it remains, and it is 
still in wide use for investigations and interrogations.217 
 
214 See, e.g., Tal Yarkoni, Sixteen is Not Magic: Comment on Friston (2012), [CITATION 
NEEDED] (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.talyarkoni.org/blog/2012/04/25/sixteen-is-not-magic 
-comment-on-friston-2012 (responding to a previous article claiming that a sample size of 
sixteen to thirty-two is ideal for fMRI studies). Author’s note: [Citation Needed] is a blog 
commenting on the use of statistical data to prove or disprove statements made by members 
of the scientific and other communities. 
215 See How Much Does an fMRI Machine Cost?, QUORA, https://www.quora.com/How  
-much-does-an-fMRI-machine-cost (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
216 See Magnetic Resonance, Functional (fMRI) – Brain, RADIOLOGYINFO.ORG (June 
23, 2014), http://www.radiologyinfo.org/en/info.cfm?pg=fmribrain. 
217 See generally KEN ALDER, THE LIE DETECTORS: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN 
OBSESSION (2007) (recounting the history of the United States’ adoption of the polygraph 
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The Supreme Court expressed its skepticism of the value of 
polygraph evidence in a 1998 case, United States v. Scheffer, 
challenging the military’s policy of refusing to admit evidence of 
polygraph tests in court martials.218 Military Rule of Evidence 707 
prohibits the introduction of polygraph evidence into a court martial by 
either the prosecution or the defense.219 
 
machine to solve crimes and evaluate the truthfulness of witnesses at trial); Jeffrey Bellin, 
The Significance (If Any) for the Federal Criminal Justice System of Advances in Lie 
Detector Technology, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 711 (2007) (examining three common evidentiary 
objections to lie detector evidence and to the underlying validity of the science of lie 
detectors: “(1) lie detector evidence impermissibly invades the traditional province of the 
jury to evaluate witness credibility, (2) it is barred under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
because it is likely to ‘mislead’ the jury, and (3) it violates Federal Rule of Evidence 704’s 
prohibition of expert testimony regarding the ‘ultimate issue’”). 
 In line with the theme of emerging technologies being adopted for forensic use, the 
development of Röntgen Rays and then the X-ray, which literally provided an image of the 
inside of a person’s head, was also quickly adapted for courtroom use and almost as quickly 
rejected as incapable of providing information useful to a court proceeding. Tovino, supra 
note 210, at 207–17 (“Although x-ray is capable of showing the detailed structure of the 
skull, it cannot distinguish among the brain’s soft tissues. X-ray also does not reveal how 
the brain functions, a limitation of which nineteenth-century courts were aware.” (footnotes 
omitted) (citing WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF LOCALIZING 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN 61 (2001))). 
218 See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998). 
219 MIL. R. EVID. 707; Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 305. In this case, the defendant, Airman 
Scheffer, facing court martial for drug use, sought to introduce the results of a polygraph 
exam, which proved his claim that he had not knowingly used drugs since entering the Air 
Force was truthful. Id. at 306. Unfortunately for Airman Scheffer, a urinalysis came back 
indicating the presence of methamphetamines. Id. He appealed his conviction on the grounds 
that Rule 707 was unconstitutional and that he should have been able to introduce the 
polygraph findings as evidence of his innocence to counter the urinalysis. See id. at 307–08. 
The Supreme Court upheld the Rule and the Air Force’s decision to bar the polygraph 
evidence, holding that the Air Force’s only constitutional obligation was to admit reliable 
evidence, which, based on the Court’s review of the literature, did not include the results of 
a polygraph. Id. at 309. 
 The Court also took the opportunity to express its view about polygraph’s inherent 
unreliability. Justice Thomas wrote,  
 It is equally clear that Rule 707 serves a second legitimate governmental interest: 
Preserving the court members’ core function of making credibility determinations 
in criminal trials. A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that “the 
jury is the lie detector.” Determining the weight and credibility of witness 
testimony, therefore, has long been held to be the “part of every case [that] belongs 
to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and 
their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.” 
Id. at 312–13 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting United States v. 
Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (C.A.9 1973); then quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 
U.S. 76, 88 (1891)). Further commenting on the history of polygraph evidence, Justice 
Thomas wrote, 
Governmental use of polygraph tests, however, is primarily in the field of 
personnel screening, and to a lesser extent as a tool in criminal and intelligence 
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While it is too early to say that all neuroimaging evidence which 
purports to evaluate the truthfulness of a witness’s testimony is 
inherently unreliable; before it can be admitted, it should at least 
surpass a technology which has been found inherently unreliable. 
I. Neuroimaging Shares the Inherent Weaknesses of Other Forensic 
Scientific Technologies 
Proponents of introducing evidence retrieved from the brain of a 
witness are essentially asking that this technology be added to the list 
of forensic sciences now used in U.S. courts, and, by doing so, subject 
it to the same reappraisal being given to even long-accepted 
technologies, such as fingerprint and DNA identification. 
Like fingerprint analysis, neuroimaging depends on patterns which 
are unique to each individual. A consistent thread that runs through all 
forensic technologies claiming to identify humans, either through 
physical characteristics or behavioral traits, is that they consistently 
underestimate the diversity of the human race.220 Just as DNA 
matching is facing criticism for failure to maintain a sufficiently large 
database of the genetic make-up of the U.S. population, a frequent 
criticism of the results of lie-detecting experiments using neuroimaging 
is that they are based on very few people.221 
 
investigations, but not as evidence at trials. Such limited, out of court uses of 
polygraph techniques obviously differ in character from, and carry less severe 
consequences than, the use of polygraphs as evidence in a criminal trial. They do 
not establish the reliability of polygraphs as trial evidence, and they do not 
invalidate reliability as a valid concern supporting Rule 707’s categorical ban. 
Id. at 312 n.8 (citation omitted). 
 Polygraph exams still have many supporters and are still widely administered. See, e.g., 
Daniel J. Mangan et al., Rebuttal to Objections by Iacono and Verschuere et al., 95 
PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 29, 31 (2008) (claiming that the Quadri-Track Zone Comparison 
Technique can if properly administered result in up to .99 accuracy in detecting deception 
and that the test has “met the National Research Council’s scientific criteria” for reliability). 
220 See Brent Garland & Mark S. Frankel, Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue 
About Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience, and Law, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 102 
(2006) (considering whether attempts will be made to identify individuals as having criminal 
or violent tendencies based on their thought patterns). 
221 See Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 653, 656 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he chief challenge emerging from advances 
in brain science is not the insidious collection of brain data, but how brain data is (mis)used 
and (mis)interpreted in legal and policy settings by the government and private actors 
alike”); cf. Andrew Pollack, DNA Evidence Can Be Fabricated, Scientists Show, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/science/18dna.html (reporting that 
Israeli scientists have demonstrated that it is possible to fabricate DNA evidence including 
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III 
WHY THE PREJUDICE OF NEUROIMAGING OUTWEIGHS ITS LOW 
PROBATIVE VALUE 
The problem with using neuroimaging technology in the courtroom 
as a method of assessing witness credibility is that it perpetuates 
continued misunderstanding of what exactly is being retrieved and 
therefore is not of assistance to the jury.222 Presenting a technology as 
a “lie detector” suggests that it surpasses the human ability to detect 
deception and is inconsistent with the purpose of scientific evidence in 
a criminal trial.223 
A. fMRI Results Cannot Replace the Jury in Civil or Criminal Trials 
Scientists discussing the technology’s limitations do not always use 
language that lawyers and other lay people understand. The current 
limits of neurotechnology are well understood within the scientific 
community, however.224 
A better understanding of what current researchers are claiming as 
success in detecting deception reveals how limited a forensic tool 
neuroimaging really is. The studies shown so far claim to identify brain 
 
“construct[ing] a sample of DNA to match that profile without obtaining any tissue from 
that person”). 
222 To the extent that this technology is offered as a way of retrieving memories from 
willing but forgetful witnesses it faces the same objections as other efforts to improve recall 
such as hypnosis or medication or even direct electrical stimulation. Cf. Lorinda B. Camparo 
et al., Interviewing Children About Real and Fictitious Events: Revisiting the Narrative 
Elaboration Procedure, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 63 (2001) (describing and evaluating a 
technique in which children are showed cards as prompts for them to recall more about an 
event in the past without the risk of contaminating the memories with suggestions); Namita 
Nayyar, Improving Memory and Concentration with Yoga, WOMEN FITNESS (Sept. 30, 
2014), http://www.womenfitness.net/yoga_ad.htm (suggesting yoga as a memory 
enhancer). 
223 See Merlino et al., supra note 123, at 417–18. 
224 Kozel et al., supra note 89, at 10. Describing a very successful study in which they 
were able to replicate earlier results in detecting deception among twenty-nine research 
subjects, the scientists cautioned, 
 Although this is an important validation step, further work needs to address how 
robust these findings might be with different testing scenarios and populations. 
The scenario used was a simple laboratory paradigm with healthy adult 
participants. Testing when there is greater risk (e.g. prison, large financial loss, 
etc.) or in people with illnesses taking medications may result in a different 
outcome. Another important consideration is that this study only provides support 
for the analysis methodology used in these studies. Different analysis strategies 
and testing formats will require independent evaluation and replication. 
Id. 
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patterns, which consistently accompany deliberate attempts by subjects 
to provide false information. For example, a subject holding an ace of 
clubs reports he is holding a queen of spades. A separate but related 
line of research involves monitoring the brain patterns of subjects who 
are shown pictures of people or places with which they are or are not 
familiar.225 Whatever the success rates of these studies, they all share 
common limitations: they have been done on only a small sample of 
people and those people have all been willing subjects.226 
1. The Role of the Jury 
It is common knowledge that, in the United States, the jury’s 
function is to hear the evidence presented by both sides and make a 
determination of the relevant facts. Often this requires the jury to 
choose between, or among, inconsistent testimony by witnesses. In 
choosing one witness’s account of events over another’s, they become 
human lie detectors. Both civil litigants and those facing serious 
criminal charges are entitled to a trial by jury. The jury is then 
instructed by the judge on the legal standards for the matter before it 
and the jury applies the law to the facts it has found. While juries in the 
United States are the ultimate deciders of the facts, it is the judge’s job 
to evaluate what evidence they will have to make their decision.227 The 
 
225 MEDINA, supra note 32, at 61 (identifying that these studies can show with strong 
reliability specific neurons which react to specific images or words). 
226 See Justin R. Masterman, Reading the Mindreading Studies: Current Debates About 
fMRI Research Methods Bear on Policy Questions, SCI. PROGRESS (Apr. 23, 2009), 
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/04/fmri-mindreading-studies/. For an explanation of 
the Vul study Masterman discussed set to music, see The TAWOP Channel, A Public Debate 
on Statistics in fMRI Research, YOUTUBE (Dec. 31, 2009), http://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=nMZvpVwfObE (explaining the limitations of FMRI as a method of reading 
thoughts, neuroscientist Ed Vul explained that scientists are only at the beginning of the 
process of associating meaning to the brain activity they measure). 
227 See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 577–78 
(1997) (noting the relatively recent role of the Anglo-American jury as evaluators of 
credibility in criminal trials). Fisher notes that it is only within the last 150 years of “the 
nearly 800-year history of the criminal trial jury” that juries were asked to “choose between 
the sworn testimony of accuser and accused at a criminal trial” because “[n]ot until the 
second half of the nineteenth century could accused criminals anywhere in the common law 
world testify under oath at their own trials.” Id. at 579. Fisher’s thesis is that the rise of the 
jury to its current status has little to do with any real belief that “the jury can answer all 
credibility questions” and more with a desire to “present to the public an ‘answer’—a single 
verdict of guilty or not guilty—that resolves all questions of credibility in a way that is 
largely immune from challenge or review. By making the jury its lie detector, the system 
protects its own legitimacy.” Id. Although Fisher’s article is structured to explain and 
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judge does so according to the rules of evidence adopted by her state, 
or, if the case is in federal court, by the Federal Rules of Evidence. The 
judge’s role as gatekeeper is especially important when either party 
wants the jury to consider scientific evidence, such as the results of an 
fMRI test. 
2. How Good Do Juries Need to Be at Detecting Lies? 
Research suggests that none of us, jurors included, are as good at 
detecting when we are being deceived as we think we are. In part, this 
is because people have developed beliefs about the behavior of liars 
that are actually better proxies for nervousness than deliberate 
deception.228 
Whether juries should be given the authority to assess witness 
credibility is beyond the scope of this Article, except to say that it is 
unlikely to be taken away from them in the near future.229 It has 
become something of a legal academic truism that jurors are not 
especially successful at distinguishing between truth tellers and 
liars.230 It is also generally accepted that the collective wisdom of 
jurors is no better than the limited skills of ordinary individuals in 
detecting lies.231 Others, such as Professor Max Minzner, believe that 
the concerns about jurors’ abilities may well be overstated based on a 
misunderstanding of the behavioral research presented to the legal 
community. He writes that the research on the poor accuracy of 
assessing demeanor as a marker of truth telling has been 
overgeneralized: 
 
support this thesis, it also serves as an excellent resource for understanding the jury’s role. 
“[E]vidence from the jurors, this they hide entirely from us.” Id. at 578. 
228 See Pardo, supra note 76, at 302 & n.2. 
229 Neuroimaging technology’s ability to aid lie detection is complicated by a recent 
significant misunderstanding in the academic community regarding juries’ ability to serve 
as fact finders, with many critics attributing the ability of jurors to tell truth telling from 
lying lies as no better than chance. See Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, 
and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2564–65 (2008) (discussing the problems with 
allowing juries to serve as principal deception detectors). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 2565. There may be a difference between the perception that jurors are not 
skilled at distinguishing witnesses telling the truth from those who lie and the reality. 
Professor Max Minzner suggests that the “dismal view among legal academics” of jurors’ 
abilities is based on social science research which does not duplicate conditions in the 
courtroom. Id. at 2566. Minzner points out that while evaluations of a witnesses’ demeanor 
may not be very useful in assessing credibility, jurors actually make decisions within a 
specific context which provides much more information than just demeanor. See id. at 2567. 
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While the newest results on lie detection support the now-traditional 
view in legal academia that demeanor is not a valuable tool in making 
credibility decisions, they undermine the further conclusion that 
accurately detecting lies is impossible and, as a result, we should 
view credibility decisions by juries as no better than a coin flip.232 
Instead, he writes: “We just do not yet know enough about bias, base 
rates, and the value of context to say whether the social science 
evidence supports the currently skeptical view on legal lie 
detection.”233 When looked at as a whole, we see that people are, in 
fact, fairly skilled at telling when a person they know well is lying about 
something important. 
B. fMRI Presents Prejudice Versus Probative Concerns in 
Investigations as Well as Trials 
The legal constraints on the government’s use of brain imaging 
techniques extend beyond those which apply to introducing evidence 
in a U.S. courtroom. Much of the research into reading thoughts has 
been funded by the federal government, either directly or channeled 
through seemingly independent private foundations.234 The federal 
government has expressed interest in using brain imaging technology 
as an interrogation tool and also as a method of identification.235 
Research suggests that brain patterns are highly individualized, and 
perhaps absolutely unique, so that a brain scan of an individual can be 
used to identify that individual.236 Of course, like fingerprints, this 
depends on the subject having been available earlier for a baseline brain 
scan—at which point both DNA samples and fingerprints could also 
have been obtained. 
Lives and reputations can be ruined by false accusations, such as 
Gary Condit from the Chandra Levy scandal,237 as well as by time 
 
232 Id. at 2578. 
233 Id.  
234 See MORENO, supra note 30, at 102–03 (discussing brain imaging projects funded by 
DARPA). 
235 See id. at 101 (reporting that DARPA has funded a variety of brain imaging projects 
such as a device to “measur[e] brain activity and wirelessly transmit all that information to 
a computer that will interpret the information for various purposes”). 
236 K.V.R. Ravi & Ramaswamy Palaniappan, Recognising Individuals Using Their Brain 
Patterns (2005) (conference paper), http://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings/icita/2005 
/2316/02/231620520.pdf. 
237 See Associated Press, Ingmar Guandique, Chandra Levy Murder Suspect, Due in 
D.C. Court, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
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wasted by false leads. This is especially true when a false lead diverts 
the investigation from other suspects. 
Usually, the hope of those investigating a crime is that the evidence 
they use to identify suspects and even arrest them are available for use 
in court; this is not always the case. An immediate need for information 
may supersede the need for admissible evidence. 
Investigators and police should be, but mostly are not, limited to 
using methods not admissible in court when nothing else has worked 
and the information is of vital importance. Within this context, 
neuroimaging may seem like an attractive option because, to the best 
of anyone’s knowledge, it is not harmful to the subject being 
scanned.238 
There is nothing unusual or even inappropriate about using 
inadmissible evidence in an investigation, but the harm comes when 
investigators and the public overestimate the accuracy of the 
technology involved. This is always the case with technology, but it is 
more serious in neuroimaging because of the aura of superhuman 
ability to look into people’s minds. For example, while a desperate 
family may well employ a psychic, it is unlikely that if a psychic 
identified someone as the killer he or she would face a seriously 
increased risk of suspicion or indictment.239 
There are also legal consequences to identifying someone as a 
person of interest or having knowledge based on information that the 
 
/2010/05/14/ingmar-guandique-chandra-_n_576148.html; Associated Press, Suspect 
Indicted in Murder of Chandra Levy, FOX NEWS (May 21, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com 
/story/0,2933,520916,00.html; Who Killed Chandra Levy?, WASH. POST: SPECIAL SERIES 
(July 11, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/specials/chandra/. 
238 See Jennifer J. Kulynych, The Regulation of MR Neuroimaging Research: 
Disentangling the Gordian Knot, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 295–96 (2007). One of the 
advantages of fMRI technology is that it does not involve exposure to harmful radiation, 
however that does not mean it is an entirely risk free procedure. Id. However, although 
“usually” “benign” “an MRI scanner is a powerful medical device, capable of causing 
serious injury or death if operated carelessly.” Id.; see also Steven Goldberg, MRIs and the 
Perception of Risk, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 229, 232–33 (2007) (noting that although the name 
of the technology was changed from “nuclear magnetic resonance” imaging to “magnetic 
resonance” imaging in order to reduce the perception of risk in fact “MRIS, unlike x-rays, 
do not expose patients to radioactivity.” (footnote omitted)). 
239 See Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation & the Obama 
Plan, 85 IND. L.J. 491, 499 (2010). The immediate problem faced by those trying to use the 
testimony of a psychic to prove guilt would be admissibility. There is no legal 
acknowledgement of the ability of any person to have superhuman ability to predict the 
future: “Foretelling events is generally relegated to the realm of fantasy or science fiction. 
Although there are thousands of mediums and spiritualists that claim prophetic powers, and 
even respected public figures are sometimes rumored to consult psychics, few people will 
publicly admit to taking precognitive abilities seriously.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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police themselves know to be unreliable. While law enforcement 
personnel have a qualified immunity for good faith acts that they take 
in furtherance of their job, there are limits. For example, a police 
department which publicly announced that someone was a person of 
interest—based on nothing but the belief of a fortune teller—might 
well find itself facing a section 1983 action for violating the person’s 
constitutional rights.240 This remedy may provide a safeguard against 
false accusations based on fMRI scans. 
IV 
THE DANGERS OF IRREPARABLE HARM: WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO 
BAN TRUTH VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY RATHER THAN MODIFY IT? 
A. In the Courtroom 
Far worse than the inability to escape the stigma of a wrongful 
accusation is to be arrested, tried, convicted, or executed based on this 
accusation. As in investigations, once information based on 
neuroimaging is presented to the jury, it will inevitably affect their 
decision. Although every state’s evidence laws characterize expert 
testimony as an aid to jury deliberation—which the jury can choose to 
take into consideration or not—the reality is quite different. As stated 
previously in Part II.D.3, much has been written about the CSI effect 
with both defense attorneys and prosecutors claiming harm.241 
Nevertheless, it would be difficult for any prosecutor to deny that her 
hope in introducing forensic evidence is for the jury to believe that the 
defendant’s guilt, or at least presence at the scene of the crime, is a 
 
240 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a 
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive 
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to 
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”). 
241 See Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 130, at 1342–43. “The term CSI effect appears to 
have entered the popular lexicon late in 2002 in an article in Time magazine” cited by Cole 
and Dioso-Villa. Id. at 1338. That article described “a growing public expectation that police 
labs can do everything TV labs can.” Jeffrey Kluger, How Science Solves Crimes, TIME 
(Oct. 21, 2002), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003480,00.html. 
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scientific fact. In light of the contemporary battle over the 
unquestioning adoption of almost any forensic technique as dispositive, 
it is likely that there will be curbs to the indiscriminate presentation of 
forensic evidence. 
Technology which purports to read minds, however, has a different 
effect than that intended to match bullets. Jurors who are presented with 
technology that claims superhuman powers are in reality being told to 
substitute its findings for their judgment. Moreover, the danger of 
allowing unreliable evidence goes deeper than jury intimidation. Once 
evidence is introduced, it can be cited by the losing party as part of a 
motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the jury did not 
properly credit the available evidence. Applying the standard of what 
“a reasonable jury” would find, a trial judge is free to set aside a verdict. 
By the time forensic evidence is admitted, no effort at mitigation can 
effectively eliminate its influence over the judge and the jury. 
One of the most serious problems with letting the jury hear evidence 
obtained through fMRI is the claim that it works without the subject’s 
cooperation. While it may be true that, unlike the polygraph, the brain’s 
reaction to a familiar object is outside the scope of human control, there 
remains no definitive evidence and much questioning of this oft-
repeated claim. An even more basic problem stems from the definition 
of cooperation. So far, neuroimaging requires that the subject sit still 
during the examination. Nevertheless, even the possibility that 
someone’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and 
seizure or Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is being 
put in jeopardy requires much further consideration of proper treatment 
at trial before juries should be able to hear that evidence. 
Science has yet to unravel the mystery of thought. Once we set aside 
the construct of memories existing in the brain like images on a hard 
drive or a videotape, we are left with a strong possibility that even if it 
were somehow possible to download information directly from the 
brain, the content would be no different than what a cooperative 
witness could tell us. Unless we posit a deeply buried recording system 
to which a person recounting a memory has no access, everything 
known about the flaws of memory for oral statements and witnessed 
events applies just as much to information extracted via neuroimaging. 
Assuming no intent to deceive, the oral testimony a person makes about 
his recollection of an event is simply a reflection of whatever 
“memory” would be captured by an fMRI. Even worse for forensic 
purposes, the brain does not flag memories as having been distorted. 
Rather, whatever phenomenon makes a person believe that he is 
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recounting what he saw is the same whether the recounting is accurate 
or not. It is as if modern neuroscience has proved the often stated 
aphorism that people can make their own reality. 
B. How the Characteristics of Information Acquired Through 
Neurotechnology Are Unhelpful to Investigators and Prejudicial to 
Litigants 
This Article considers the functional limits of current 
neurotechnology by considering the underlying flawed premise that 
brain activity detected while a person is giving a deceptive answer 
actually reflects deception in high stress situations. However, another 
criticism can be made of even the most accurate “lie detector”; alone, 
it is of very limited utility in the real world of criminal investigations 
or jury trials. If the best neuroimaging can do is identify the sincerity 
of “yes” or “no” answers, it is a very expensive machine for playing 
Twenty Questions.242 It is also not significantly more helpful to 
investigators than the much more cost-effective existing polygraph 
technology. 
Consider this scenario familiar to viewers of cable news shows like 
Nancy Grace: a child or young woman is missing and the last person 
to see the missing person denies any knowledge of what happened.243 
The police declare this witness a “person of interest” but cannot force 
him or her to testify. A technology that materially determines whether 
or not the witness is being truthful in his or her denials of knowledge is 
somewhat like a high-tech version of Twenty Questions. The game is 
certainly impossible if the informant is lying about the item’s 
characteristics, and it becomes an inefficient and often frustrating 
method of discovering anything but the simplest factual information. 
 
242 Twenty Questions is a game; the goal is to identify an object another is thinking of 
only using yes or no questions. Twenty Questions, GROUP-GAMES.COM, http://www.group   
-games.com/stationary-games/twenty-questions.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). For more 
on the rules of Twenty Questions, see id. 
243 See, e.g., Is Misty Croslin Telling All?, CNN (Jan. 29, 2010, 10:46 AM), http://nancy 
grace.blogs.cnn.com/2010/01/29/is-misty-croslin-telling-all/. Misty Croslin was home with 
her step-daughter Haleigh Cummings when she claimed that “men” came in and took her. 
See id. Husband Ron Cummings claimed Misty knew more about it. See id. Misty never 
revealed any further information about her daughter, but was later imprisoned for drug 
charges. Arelis R. Hernández, Misty Croslin: Woman at Center of Missing-Girl Case 
Sentenced to 25 Years in Drug Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 11, 2011), http://articles 
.orlandosentinel.com/2011-01-11/news/os-misty-croslin-sentenced-drugs-20110111_1 
_hank-croslin-haleigh-cummings-ronald-cummings. 
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Similarly, even if an fMRI could provide an advantage over the game 
by indicating that the respondent is lying in his answers, would finding 
out that the witness is not being truthful in denying knowledge really 
bring the police any closer to locating the victim? Suppose even that 
the person of interest is the mother of the missing child. At best, the 
findings would reveal deliberate deception in answers to a series of 
specific questions, such as “did you kill your child?” Nevertheless, 
whether she is being truthful in stating that she did not kill her child 
brings us no closer to finding that child. 
As unhelpful as this kind of interrogation is to finding a missing 
child, it is even less helpful in convicting the mother of a crime. Like 
the results of a polygraph, what we really know is that she believes she 
did not kill the child. We cannot, through yes or no questions, get the 
specifics of what she did or when, let alone her state of mind. The law 
may find that she engaged in conduct that would make her legally 
liable, even while she retains the strong conviction of having done 
nothing wrong—perhaps because she blames others for whatever harm 
the child suffered. 
C. The Limits of Neuroimaging-Based Technology as a Method of 
Truth Detection 
So many people have a financial stake in the continued funding of 
fMRI research, let alone using the results, that its limits are well hidden 
in its publicity. The intent is not, at least for most researchers, deliberate 
deception so much as genuine excitement about real discovery. The 
problem is that an exciting discovery to a cognitive scientist is very 
different from a fully developed technology ready for the courtroom. 
With companies already marketing the technology, however, there is 
real danger of failure to understand the significant distance between the 
laboratory and the courtroom. 
The very limits of today’s neurotechnology as a method of deception 
detection, let alone mind reading, are highlighting what researchers 
trumpet as their greatest discoveries. As discussed previously, even if 
it were possible to obtain direct access to human memory with perfect 
accuracy, this would not be a significant improvement over current 
methods of investigation or trial. The current probative value and high 
prejudicial nature of interpreted information obtained through 
neuroimaging is so limited that it cannot meet even the threshold 
requirements for contemporary forensic science or investigative 
techniques. 
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The problem goes far deeper than a concern over intermediate 
technology. The limits of neuroimaging in its current Twenty 
Questions form are only part of the reason for distrusting its findings. 
No matter how well this technology succeeds in retrieving memories, 
those memories will share all the flaws and limitations identified in the 
study of eyewitness testimony. One of the more lovely images of 
retrieving a memory comes from the Harry Potter series in which a 
device called a “pensieve” is used to make memories take on the 
physical form of a wisp of smoke, which can be captured inside a glass 
ball for later viewing.244 When needed, the memory can be removed 
and replayed with a vividness and immediacy that gives the observer 
the feeling of actually being present at the events recalled.245 In many 
ways, this is a very helpful analogy, because if indeed a retrieved 
memory can be replayed, it will only be in the form it was originally 
taken in. Without the use of this magical device, we are forced to 
acknowledge that real memories may be subconsciously altered or fade 
over time. 
D. Imposing a Moratorium 
The American criminal justice system lacks a central authority 
which could easily impose a moratorium on any specific forensic 
technique; the federal government and each of the fifty states maintain 
separate systems. However, the history of discredited forensic 
scientific techniques provides a roadmap for reform and some lessons 
for caution. The most common way for a technique to be barred is 
through its failure to meet current standards of admissibility for 
scientific evidence. The best example comes from the history of 
polygraph evidence, which was first barred from federal courts by the 
D.C. Circuit Court in Frye v. United States because it had not gained 
“general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”246 
This ban was not categorical, however, and today evidence from 
polygraphy must satisfy the Federal Rules of Evidence under 
Daubert.247 The result of this method has been a patchwork in which 
 
244 E.g., J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE 198 (2005). See 
generally The Pensieve, LANGUAGE REALM, http://www.languagerealm.com/hplang 
/pensieve.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
245 See The Pensieve, supra note 244. 
246 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
247 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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various federal district courts and appellate courts have adopted 
different interpretations for admissibility which then may, or may not, 
be resolved by the Supreme Court.248 
Admissibility tests similarly vary not only between states, but also 
vary within a state, even when the United States Supreme Court has 
spoken on the issue. Some states and the U.S. military, however, have 
actually barred polygraphy evidence by statute as a method of 
bolstering or disputing the truthfulness of witness testimony, which 
obviates the need for its being introduced and challenged in each 
jurisdiction.249 The statutory moratoriums are far more efficient and, 
in the case of neuroimaging technology, could be developed as a model 
rule which would be proposed in individual state legislatures and 
Congress. 
V 
BEYOND A MORATORIUM: PROPOSALS FOR LIMITING THE DANGER 
OF PREMATURE USE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED BY ANALYZING 
NEUROIMAGING DATA PURPORTING TO IDENTIFY HUMAN MEMORY 
Until there are uniform standards for interpreting neuroimaging data 
for testimonial purposes, states and the federal government should 
impose a moratorium on the use of fMRI imaging as a method of truth 
verification for any forensic or investigatory purpose. Without those 
standards, it is impossible to effectively counter testimony interpreting 
the data. In the interim, however, there are several steps which can, and 
should, be taken if neuroimaging is going to be used in criminal 
investigations or in court. Some of these solutions have been proposed 
in the context of limits on the introduction of other forensic sciences.250 
The National Research Council’s (NRC) proposed framework for 
using neuroimaging evidence is a useful starting point. One of their 
 
248 See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228–29 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding 
Daubert overruled per se inadmissibility of polygraph evidence); United States v. Williams, 
95 F.3d 723, 730 (8th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging potential for polygraph evidence to be 
misleading under FED. R. EVID. 403); Conti v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995) (“[U]nilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost 
never admissible under Evidence Rule 403.”). 
249 See, e.g., MIL. R. EVID. 707(a) (making results from polygraph testing inadmissible 
in court martial proceedings); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.45(1) (2015) (prohibiting 
requiring sexual assault victims to submit to polygraph tests). 
250 See Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence after Daubert, 1 ANN. 
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 105, 126–28 (2005). Law Professors Michael Saks and David Faigman 
have been very active in proposing reforms to the entire system introducing forensic 
scientific evidence and have several proposals that would mitigate the prejudicial effects of 
potentially misleading information reaching the jury. 
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umbrella suggestions which would greatly improve the consistency and 
fairness of forensic science in U.S. courts is to create independently 
operated centers for forensic examination sponsored by non-profit or 
government agencies.251 Access to all forensic sciences depends on the 
availability of money to pay for both testing and expert testimony, but 
this is of particular concern in neuroimaging because the equipment is 
expensive and the experts few. Even if the underlying technology 
achieves acceptable rates of reliability and accuracy, these tests should 
be restricted to independently run centers equally available to the 
defense and prosecution. 
Many of the NRC’s recommendations are simply good practice. For 
example, allowing both parties to examine technicians who conducted 
the test and experts who analyzed data before motions in limine; 
requiring that the examining and testifying experts be available at the 
motion in limine stage for the judge to assess their credibility; and if 
the evidence is admitted, mandating that the jury hear testimony to 
rebut the reliability of the neuroimaging’s technique and analysis.252 
Another necessary safeguard concerns the possibility that 
neuroimaging evidence will be introduced through a report rather than 
a testifying expert. It is particularly important with regard to this new 
technology that the reports of neuroimaging experts be understood as 
interpretations and not as facts. 
Finally, to avoid the risk that a jury believes it cannot reject the 
findings of a “truth machine” anytime this testimony is offered, there 
must also be jury instructions, such as the ones routinely given 
regarding testimony by a police officer, that the jury retains ultimate 
responsibility for all determinations of credibility.253 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered claims that neuroimaging technology 
can benefit the justice system by providing direct access to the thoughts 
of an unwilling witness. It does this first by describing the claims of 
forensic fMRI developers. Second, it puts those claims to the legal test 
 
251 See generally NAS Report, supra note 99. 
252 See generally id. 
253 See Note, supra note 33 (discussing how additional jury instructions will allow better 
assessment of the relative value of different pieces of evidence presented at trial by 
informing juries of specific problems with and reliability metrics for different types of 
evidence). 
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that all scientific evidence must satisfy to be presented to a jury: does 
it surpass the jury’s own basic abilities and, if so, to what extent? Third, 
it reviews the claims made for neuroimaging in the context of the 
current criticisms raised by advocates of the wrongly convicted about 
the danger of overvaluing eyewitness testimony. 
The research of science of memory as applied to eyewitness 
testimony scientifically proves what most people already know 
intuitively: people present at the same event can sincerely believe that 
they are truthfully describing it even though their descriptions are 
mutually inconsistent. Thus, whether memories of past events are 
offered willingly through eyewitnesses or extracted by technology, the 
contents of any one person’s memories and thoughts are a construct 
individual to that person, not a process of retrieving a mechanical 
recording. 
While many forensic sciences can be criticized on these grounds, 
technology that purports to directly access thoughts is particularly 
pernicious because it advances the scientifically unsupportable 
proposition that these thoughts are an unfiltered record of past events. 
The information obtained from neuroimaging is not now, and never 
will be, reliable for the purposes of either truth verification or reading 
thoughts because it claims to directly access thought and memory, 
which are malleable products of individuals’ brains. The inherent 
limitations of a technology which accesses thoughts prevents it from 
being an improvement over current investigatory techniques or juror 
determinations of credibility. Finally, the guarantee of a fair trial and 
normative principles of fairness weigh against the adoption of a 
technology which does not materially assist a jury in assessing the 
credibility of witnesses. Rather neuroimaging technology will 
prejudice a fair trial by suggesting that direct access to the brain is a 
direct access to past events at which the witness was present regardless 
of attempts to limit prejudice. 
 
